In 2017, Indian and Chinese soldiers had a 72-day long standoff inside Bhutan which ended with an announcement of disengagement by both sides. While the Indian soldiers returned to their post by stepping back a few hundred metres, the Chinese stepped back by an equal distance to stay in the Doklam plateau. Satellite images later captured the military infrastructure—roads, watchtowers, bunkers, helipads, accommodation, warehouses—built by the Chinese in the area post the disengagement. The Indian military had moved in to stop the Chinese from making a road to Jampheri Ridge. The ridge is strategically important because it overlooks the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip of land connecting north-eastern India to the rest of the country. The Chinese built a road hugging the Amu Chu river—which runs close to the Doklam plateau—towards Jampheri Ridge, even though they are yet to reach it. Since 2020, while Thimphu has been constantly engaging with Beijing, New Delhi’s ties with the latter have plummeted. In this time, India’s responses to the border crisis—if they can even be called responses—have become increasingly incomprehensible. Indian statements instead give the impression that there is little sense to be had in New Delhi’s China strategy.
In 2021, China and Bhutan signed a memorandum of understanding on a “three-step roadmap,” to expedite their bilateral border negotiations. Last October, they agreed on guidelines for a joint technical team to delimit and demarcate the boundary. Then Bhutanese prime minister Lotay Tshering emphasised last year that there were no “real differences between Bhutan and China” and that one more meeting “while we are in office will clinch the issue.” He also told the media, “Theoretically, how can Bhutan not have bilateral relations with China? The question is when and in what manner.”
Lotay is no longer in office, having lost the election earlier this year, but his successor, Tshering Tobgay, has stuck to the same line. China has emerged as Bhutan’s biggest trading partner, surpassing India. While the Chinese power corporation is involved in major hydel projects in the country, the Chinese railway company is exploring railway connections through a link between two major Tibetan towns, Lhasa and Gyantse. The Modi government recently proposed the construction of a motorable road connecting Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh and Gauhati in Assam through Bhutan, but Thimphu is not enthusiastic about the proposal until its border with China is demarcated. Bhutan does not even acknowledge, let alone object to, the construction of Chinese well-off villages in its territory.
At the end of the Doklam crisis, the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, sought an informal summit with China’s president, Xi Jinping, to do a China reset. Two such meetings were held—one at Wuhan in 2018 and the other at Chennai in 2019. Both leaders agreed to provide strategic guidance to their respective militaries but to little effect, as the events of 2020 were to prove. In June that year, India and China recorded the death of Indian soldiers in the Galwan valley in Ladakh. These were the first military casualties on the Line of Actual Control in forty-five years.
Dakini99 on April 21st, 2024 at 09:46 UTC »
The Indian establishment lacks that combination of hawkishness and competence that is necessary to deal with a bigger adversary.
The BJP drumbeats about nationalism. But they really aren't very good at policy or administration. They're unwilling to push any of the levers at their disposal. They claim to ban a handful of Chinese companies but Chinese consumer goods like the Insta360 cameras and Coros watches and MG Hector cars continue to be sold in large numbers in India. They don't consistently implement their own policy.
They do absolutely nothing about Tibet. About Xinjiang. About Taiwan. There are a lot of buttons they're not pushing, largely because they don't know the game. They don't know and are not prepared to deal with the some of the potentially unpleasant outcomes of pushing these buttons. There's a cost benefit analysis to everything. They're not savvy enough to play the game. They just want to be left alone to do their growth and development thing. So the Chinese have their way with them.
Modi and his right hand man Shah are people from Gujarat. They're largely a very pacifist community of (financially astute) traders and businessmen. They get riled up only about Islam. Too myopic to comprehend the world outside their borders. Ladakh is too far away for most Indians.
The Indian civil service is too hobbled by bureaucracy and sycophancy from the Congress days. It actively penalised initiative and originality. The foreign ministry lacks awareness or understanding of any complex plays and geopolitics. Their bread and butter since independence was the refrain about Pakistan. It'll take a couple more generations for them to get a grip on things. Until then China will probably have a few more slices of spicy Indian salami.
telephonecompany on April 21st, 2024 at 08:52 UTC »
Theatre of the Absurd The defense secretary’s entreaties to the US admit India’s inability to handle China
SUSHANT SINGH 21 March, 2024
In 2017, Indian and Chinese soldiers had a 72-day long standoff inside Bhutan which ended with an announcement of disengagement by both sides. While the Indian soldiers returned to their post by stepping back a few hundred metres, the Chinese stepped back by an equal distance to stay in the Doklam plateau. Satellite images later captured the military infrastructure—roads, watchtowers, bunkers, helipads, accommodation, warehouses—built by the Chinese in the area post the disengagement. The Indian military had moved in to stop the Chinese from making a road to Jampheri Ridge. The ridge is strategically important because it overlooks the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip of land connecting north-eastern India to the rest of the country. The Chinese built a road hugging the Amu Chu river—which runs close to the Doklam plateau—towards Jampheri Ridge, even though they are yet to reach it. Since 2020, while Thimphu has been constantly engaging with Beijing, New Delhi’s ties with the latter have plummeted. In this time, India’s responses to the border crisis—if they can even be called responses—have become increasingly incomprehensible. Indian statements instead give the impression that there is little sense to be had in New Delhi’s China strategy.
In 2021, China and Bhutan signed a memorandum of understanding on a “three-step roadmap,” to expedite their bilateral border negotiations. Last October, they agreed on guidelines for a joint technical team to delimit and demarcate the boundary. Then Bhutanese prime minister Lotay Tshering emphasised last year that there were no “real differences between Bhutan and China” and that one more meeting “while we are in office will clinch the issue.” He also told the media, “Theoretically, how can Bhutan not have bilateral relations with China? The question is when and in what manner.”
Lotay is no longer in office, having lost the election earlier this year, but his successor, Tshering Tobgay, has stuck to the same line. China has emerged as Bhutan’s biggest trading partner, surpassing India. While the Chinese power corporation is involved in major hydel projects in the country, the Chinese railway company is exploring railway connections through a link between two major Tibetan towns, Lhasa and Gyantse. The Modi government recently proposed the construction of a motorable road connecting Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh and Gauhati in Assam through Bhutan, but Thimphu is not enthusiastic about the proposal until its border with China is demarcated. Bhutan does not even acknowledge, let alone object to, the construction of Chinese well-off villages in its territory.
At the end of the Doklam crisis, the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, sought an informal summit with China’s president, Xi Jinping, to do a China reset. Two such meetings were held—one at Wuhan in 2018 and the other at Chennai in 2019. Both leaders agreed to provide strategic guidance to their respective militaries but to little effect, as the events of 2020 were to prove. In June that year, India and China recorded the death of Indian soldiers in the Galwan valley in Ladakh. These were the first military casualties on the Line of Actual Control in forty-five years.
All this while, many Indian analysts had continued to hail the government and the military for standing up to China, that too inside Bhutan. Beijing saw it differently. In a 2017 analysis of the Doklam crisis, the PLA’s Western Theatre Command asserted that the aim was “to make India succumb without a confrontation between the two armies,” adding that the approach served lessons “for future struggles.”
Beijing has learned lessons from Doklam and applied them well to the Ladakh border crisis. And the Modi government, by no longer asking for a return to status quo as it existed before May 2020, or restoration of full patrolling rights for Indian soldiers, has succumbed to Chinese designs. The former foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale argued that “hardening global perceptions about Beijing might create opportunities for fresh bilateral approach,” foreseeing a new political move after the Indian general elections. Since Doklam, others have echoed the call for a “China reset” as well, but, as recently as February this year, the defence secretary Giridhar Aramane hailed India for standing up to China “on almost all fronts.” Doing the same thing and expecting a different result may be a definition of insanity, but with its timidity and fear of escalation, the Modi government has cornered itself into a box of poor options against China. Its quiver is full of broken arrows.
The answer lies in Jaishankar’s reasoning for the Modi government not making any aggressive move against China, which he offered on a podcast last year. “Look, they are the bigger economy. What am I going to do? As a smaller economy, I am going to pick up a fight with the bigger economy? It is not a question of being reactionary, it’s a question of common sense.” Pakistan has a similar imbalance vis-à-vis India, and it has chosen to equalise it by a threat of nuclear weapons, by use of asymmetric warfare and by borrowing power from countries like China and Saudi Arabia, having forged alliances with them. Jaishankar’s common sense demands that New Delhi will have to do something similar vis-à-vis Beijing. For reasons of global censure, India is unlikely to indulge in nuclear sabre-rattling against China. The military component of the so-called Tibet card no longer exists to provide viable means of waging asymmetric warfare against China. Borrowing power from other more powerful countries is the only thing the Modi government is left with.
telephonecompany on April 21st, 2024 at 08:50 UTC »
SS: This article by Sushant Singh, titled "Theatre of the Absurd," highlights the complexities and inadequacies in India's strategy against China. The piece discusses the prolonged stand-offs and diplomatic engagements between India, China, and Bhutan since the 2017 Doklam crisis, emphasizing the military and economic strides China has made in Bhutan. Despite attempts by Indian leaders to reset relations through summits and diplomatic talks, China's influence in the region continues to grow, showcased by its deepening ties with Bhutan and continuous border infrastructures. The Indian government's responses are critiqued for lacking coherence and effectiveness, leading to India's increased reliance on external powers like the United States for strategic balance. This narrative portrays India's struggle to maintain leverage over China amidst global and regional power dynamics, suggesting a scenario where India's geopolitical strategies are marred by inconsistencies and reactive measures rather than proactive planning.