Lithuanian intelligence: Russia preparing for long confrontation with NATO

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On Thursday, Lithuanian intelligence published its annual report, revealing that Russia is expending vast resources not only on the war with Ukraine but also preparing for a long-term confrontation with NATO. During the press conference presenting the contents of the book, it was also announced that Belarusian spies were caught last year, and the activities of Russian hackers were discussed.

"Russia is expending vast resources on the war in Ukraine and has shown no willingness to ease tensions, despite not having achieved its operational objectives. At the same time, Russia is preparing for a long-term confrontation with NATO, including in the Baltic Sea region, and is gradually expanding its military capability westward," the report states.

The report was compiled by the country's Ministry of National Defense and the Second Investigation Department under MND.

The report noted that the Kremlin has initiated a major reform of the armed forces, which expands Russia's military capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. Planned structural and leadership changes have already begun, with some of them being implemented in Kaliningrad and western Russia.

"This reform is a long-term project that requires significant resources and is expected to take up to ten years," representatives of Lithuanian intelligence noted.

They stated that the overall pace and scope of the reform depend directly on the course, duration and outcomes of military actions in Ukraine.

It was also noted that Russia has sufficient financial, human, material and technical resources to continue hostilities with similar intensity at least in the short term, with intelligence estimating up to two years.

The review also points out that last year the war in Ukraine cost Russia much more than planned. In the first half of 2023, military expenditures officially exceeded the amount allocated in the annual budget, and this year, at least a third of the budget has already been allocated for military needs – over ten trillion rubles or €102 billion.

"If classified budget items are considered, the actual amount is undoubtedly higher. The war and the military-industrial complex become the driving force of Russia's economy, attracting the country's financial, material and human resources from other economic sectors," stated the threat assessment.

According to the document, Russia continues preparations to restore the Moscow and Leningrad military districts abolished in 2010, replacing the current Western military district. In Karelia, a new army corps is being formed and brigades are being expanded into divisions.

Intelligence agencies also note that Belarus is building the capacity to host nuclear weapons under Russian control.

Work is underway in Belarus to renovate and equip infrastructure for storing nuclear weapons.

Additionally, the Belarusian armed forces have two main potential carriers of non-strategic nuclear weapons: attack aircraft Su-25 located at the Lida Air Force Base near Lithuania and Iskander missile systems located in Assipovichy in the central part of the country.

Belarusian armed forces personnel are preparing to work with nuclear weapons.

"Placing non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus ties it even more closely to Russia and strengthens the latter's determination to maintain control over Belarus at any cost," the report states.

It is also noted that last year Belarus received an exceptionally large amount of military equipment and weapons from Russia: Iskander missile systems capable of hitting targets up to 500 kilometers away, a battalion set of BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, S-400 air defense missile systems and Mi-35M attack helicopters.

The report mentioned that Belarusian officials are threatening Lithuanian diplomats working in Minsk for recruitment purposes, while the intelligence services of the neighboring country have also targeted the large Belarusian diaspora in Lithuania.

According to the report, in the second half of 2023, several Lithuanian citizens suspected of cooperating with Belarusian intelligence were detained in Lithuania, and charges of espionage were brought against them.

"The detainees collected and transmitted information for a fee, likely fulfilling tasks for the Belarusian intelligence," stated the threat assessment compiled by the State Security Department and the Second Investigation Department.

According to them, none of these individuals had clearance to work with classified information, did not work with such information nor had the capability to collect it.

"Although the information collected and transmitted by these individuals about the country's critical infrastructure and military objects was not classified, the data helped representatives of Belarus' undemocratic regime act against the state of Lithuania," the intelligence service claims.

Authorities emphasized that recently, Belarusian intelligence has been particularly aggressively targeting employees of the Lithuanian Belarusian diplomatic representation.

The document stated that Belarusian intelligence services monitor employees of the Lithuanian embassy in Minsk, collecting data on their contacts, habits or information that could compromise them.

"Employees are intimidated with information collected by Belarusian intelligence and administrative measures. The goal of the Belarusian intelligence services' activities is to recruit employees of the Lithuanian diplomatic representation and force them to act against the interests of Lithuania's national security," the assessment concludes.

According to Lithuanian intelligence, Belarusian intelligence services actively use interrogations of individuals traveling to the neighboring country at the border for activities against Lithuania. The report states that these interrogations reached their highest intensity last year since the start of the war in Ukraine.

Through these investigations, Belarusian officials collect information about Lithuania and try to identify individuals who could spy for Lithuania.

The same occurs at the border with Russia, but there, according to authorities, attempts to recruit Lithuanian citizens are becoming less subtle: lately, there have been more cases where cooperation offers are made without proper selection of candidates or assessing foreigners' willingness to cooperate.

"In addition to targeting travelers to Russia, attempts to recruit their close contacts have also been identified. Such a recruitment model leads to even more people being willing to report recruitment attempts to Lithuanian intelligence," the report states.

People who have contacted Lithuanian authorities after refusing to cooperate with Russian intelligence services, including cases where they were asked to collect non-classified information, are mentioned in the report.

"Russian intelligence officers' motivation is likely to weaken as the Russia-Ukraine war continues. /.../ Officials' negligence leads to an increase in mistakes, which facilitates the work of Lithuanian counterintelligence services in identifying individuals involved in criminal activities and Russian modes of operation," the report states.

It is also noted that last autumn, Belarus considered changing its laws to require its citizens to notify the Ministry of Interior when renting premises to foreigners. Lithuanian intelligence services warn that this allows Belarusian services to collect more data on visitors.

At the same time, Russia is considering requiring all foreigners to sign a loyalty contract – a special document that obliges them not to "discredit" Russian politics, its agencies and officials, and not to interfere in their activities.

"Signing such a contract is likely to lead to foreigners being held accountable for disseminating information undesirable to Russian authorities. The likely goal of such a contract is to further limit foreign citizens' rights in Russia and find pretexts for their prosecution and potential recruitment," reported Lithuanian intelligence.

The threat assessment notes that Belarusian intelligence services are also looking for Belarusian citizens who have moved to Lithuania.

Lithuania is home to a Belarusian diaspora of over 60,000 people, and this number increases by approximately 15,500 people each year.

"The interests of Lithuania's national security are threatened by Belarusian citizens who have arrived in Lithuania and whose connection with Belarusian intelligence has not been severed, in addition to Belarusian intelligence agencies using their citizens living in Lithuania who previously worked in government institutions. The recruitment system in Belarusian government institutions, strategic facilities and armed forces, which these services use, provides opportunities for this," the report states.

The report indicates a recent trend where Belarusian intelligence officers establish connections with members of the Lithuanian Belarusian diaspora and recruit them remotely.

"The growth of the Belarusian diaspora in Lithuania creates not only counterintelligence risks but also other dangers. The diaspora includes individuals who promote extreme political teachings," warned the document.

An example is litvinism – an extreme branch of Belarusian chauvinism. These individuals deny the Baltic origin of the princes who ruled the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and question the Vilnius region's belonging to Lithuania.

"The wider spread of these views among the Belarusian diaspora in Lithuania damages their integration into the country's society and contributes to the increase in national tensions. The Belarusian regime uses litvinism and information attacks to promote opposition between Belarusians arriving in Lithuania and the Lithuanian population," Lithuanian intelligence services reported.

They also note the presence of far-right teachings advocates within the Belarusian diaspora.

In the second half of 2023, they initiated the creation of the Belarusian branch of the international network of far-right groups, Active Club, in Lithuania.

Active Club is an extremist movement inspired by American far-right Robert Rando, whose followers combine the dissemination of far-right teachings with martial arts and other sports.

Lithuanian intelligence services annually publish an assessment of the threats to national security. The latest document assesses the most significant threats and risk factors to Lithuania's national security in the near future (2024–2025).

NATO Vilnius summit leak the work of GRU hackers, Lithuanian intelligence claims

Lithuanian intelligence services believe it is likely that classified information from last year's Vilnius NATO summit was stolen and published by hackers coordinated by the Russian military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

According to them, the GRU-coordinated group is characterized by aggressive, destructive activity.

Lithuanian intelligence reports that they attacked private sector information technology companies that provide services to Lithuania's critical infrastructure and key government agencies.

"It is very likely that a cyber group coordinated by the GRU published intercepted information about the meeting that was not public, likely with the intention of discrediting Lithuania internationally," stated the agency's report on national security threats published on Thursday.

"It cannot be ruled out that some of the intercepted information will be used to plan new disinformation operations," the document warns.

After the Vilnius summit in July last year, information related to a possible data leak associated with the NATO event appeared on the Telegram social network.

A hacker group calling themselves Love from Russia claimed to have accessed classified data about the security of the NATO summit, including the names of officials responsible, the routes of delegations, security systems used and more.

About 30 documents were made public, marking specific hotels where heads of state and delegations stayed, arrival times at airports, names of leaders' security personnel, their armaments and communications equipment features.

Names of snipers from the police counter-terrorism unit Aras were also disclosed, as were minutes from security group meetings preparing the summit, planned decisions on air traffic, transit between Russia and Belarus and road traffic restrictions.

The National Crisis Management Center then informed BNS that the disclosed data might be related to hacking of Lithuanian agencies' systems.

The NATO summit was held in Vilnius on July 11–12 last year.

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