The power transfer in Turkmenistan from father to son and back again is a stark example of how fragile the process of transition can be in authoritarian systems, even when the ideal conditions have been created.
When parliamentary elections were held in Turkmenistan in late March, the aim was not to refresh the ranks of lawmakers. Instead, the elections in the isolated post-Soviet dictatorship were held to formalize an unexpected reform of the power system initiated by former president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, father of President Serdar Berdymukhamedov.
The reform made Turkmenistan’s parliament, which only became bicameral in 2021, unicameral once again. The upper house—led by the former president—is now set to become a supra-state body with almost unlimited powers, allowing Gurbanguly to reclaim power from Serdar—just a year after he passed down the presidency to his son.
Things didn’t go quite as the former president had imagined they would when he stepped into the shadows after fifteen years at the helm, leaving the country in the seemingly safe hands of his son. It is becoming increasingly difficult to rule from behind the scenes; the state apparatus is confused as to what the hierarchy should be; and Serdar has not only been amassing more power, but has also taken a stand against his father’s corrupt relatives. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov now wants to regain control before it is too late.
Turkmenistan is one of the most closed-off countries in the world, so it is difficult to make decisive judgments about political life there. All available information, however—from official propaganda to leaks and rumors—indicates that the first stage of the power transition went smoothly. Serdar became president at the beginning of last year with no problems, legitimizing his authority in an election that was purely a formality, while his father stepped down to become head of the upper house of parliament, which was created specifically for him in 2021.
That was the easy part, however. The new president immediately faced numerous problems that had accumulated: the consequences of the pandemic, disruptions in the supply of essential goods, rising unemployment (over 5 percent according to official data and a staggering 60 percent according to unofficial data), and inflation, which even by official estimates exceeded 14 percent. The situation was so serious that the people of Turkmenistan were constantly protesting, despite harsh crackdowns.
Coming to power in such adverse circumstances could have immediately torpedoed Serdar’s popularity, but the stars aligned for him. Turkmenistan’s economy relies almost entirely on exporting natural gas, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused hydrocarbon prices to climb, while Turkmenistan’s main trading partner, China, finally got its economy back on track after the pandemic. As a result, revenues from Turkmen gas exports to the Chinese market (almost the country’s entire exports) grew by 51 percent in 2022 to $10.3 billion.
Moreover, compared with Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia, the Berdymukhamedov regime began to look less abhorrent to Brussels and Washington as they sought to move away from Russian gas. Accordingly, instead of focusing on human rights as usual (Turkmenistan has the third lowest freedom rating in the world), Western officials visiting Ashgabat discussed the prospects for energy cooperation. Abandoned plans for the Nabucco and Transcaspian gas pipelines that would bypass Russia to deliver Turkmen gas to Europe were resurrected.
Alarmed at the prospect of the West replacing Russian gas with Turkmenistan’s, Moscow rushed into the bidding war with promises to help Turkmenistan with energy technology and almost tripled its own purchases of Turkmen gas. Suddenly, everyone wanted a piece of the Turkmen market, and Serdar reaped the benefits.
As the country’s official leader, all negotiations with international partners were conducted with him, rather than with Gurbanguly. This was not part of the former president’s plan. In stepping aside from the presidency, he had hoped to pass on the tedium of domestic politics to his son precisely so that he could focus on key issues with his country’s international partners. Yet instead of immersing himself in mundane tasks, Serdar welcomed high-level guests himself, and embarked on visits to China, Russia, Qatar, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
Gurbanguly tried to outdo his son. In one year, he visited Russia, Japan, and South Korea. Everywhere he went, he made sure to be greeted by presidents and prime ministers. Meanwhile, at home he reportedly refused to meet with visiting foreign lawmakers, including EU delegations, seeing them as below him.
The problem was that after the transition of power, there were two leaders in Turkmenistan. And while everything might have been perfectly clear in Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s mind, he had failed to explain the tandem to anyone—including the state apparatus—prompting confusion. During overlapping foreign visits, Turkmen officials did not know whether to accompany Berdymukhamedov senior or junior; who should be allocated the motorcade, security, and journalists; and whose visit should be shown on the news first.
Serdar’s behavior at home also irritated his father. Berdymukhamedov junior moved fast to secure power, stepping on the toes of some of his father’s relatives in the process. In January 2022, he launched an attack on his powerful cousins (on his father’s side), Hajymyrat and Shamyrat Rejepov, by having their associates arrested. Soon after he was made president, the two fled Turkmenistan. Immediately after the elections, Serdar reshuffled the government, appointing several ministers, including a new minister of the interior, who owed their promotions to him.
The rebellious son then proceeded to remove his aunt (his father’s sister), Gulnabat Dovletova, from her post as CEO of the Turkmenistan Red Crescent Society. Dovletova was accused of carrying out numerous corrupt schemes such as selling humanitarian aid through her network of pharmacies and collecting contributions from state employees. Dovletova’s dismissal was followed by the arrest and detention of officials associated with her.
Serdar also brought his mother, Ogulgerek, back into the public eye. She had previously been largely absent due to strained relations with her husband, but emerged as an alternative center of family loyalty thanks to her son’s assistance.
The elder Berdymukhamedov initially refrained from intervening, but soon the scale of what was happening began to threaten his own position and the stability of the regime as a whole. The final straw for him was Serdar’s decision to appoint a new prosecutor general.
Gurbanguly launched an attack to regain real power, initiating a reform that transforms the upper house—which he leads—into a body with nearly unlimited powers. No changes, including personnel reshuffles, can be made without its approval, and the president is now placed at the same level as ministers. And, naturally, if the head of state is for any reason unable to perform his duties, they automatically pass to the chairman of the new supra-state chamber.
The saga of the power transfer in Turkmenistan from father to son and back again may look comical, but it is a stark example of how fragile the process of transition is in authoritarian systems, even when the ideal conditions have been created. At first, everything seemed to be going smoothly: power remained within one family; the people were too intimidated by repression to object; and external circumstances flooded the country with money. Yet even in such fortuitous circumstances, the previous and current leaders are locked in a power struggle, destroying hopes for security guarantees and the peaceful transfer of power.