Flying like a BRIC: the unlikely expansion of an alternative order

In this piece, Lewis Sage-Passant discusses the news that several new members – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – have been accepted into the BRICS bloc. Lewis argues that, while BRICS is riven with contradictions and challenges, its growth signals a very real challenge to Western-led international systems.

Following the August 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa, the bloc has announced plans to incorporate new members. This appears to be driven by a desire to present an alternative to the Western-led world order, in particular via the G7 and G20 format. BRICS is a particularly shaky organisation, and its expansion defies geopolitical and macroeconomic sense. Despite this, contrarianism is an increasingly popular position across much of the developing world, and determination in search of an alternative to US hegemony may give flight to an otherwise rather un-aerodynamic structure.

BRICS is an unusual international grouping, born out of an investment bank rather than from grand theories of world order. It was originally dubbed BRIC; a thought experiment in a Goldman Sachs investment prospectus paper in which Brazil, Russia, India, China were considered for their growth potential. Written in 2001, the paper had optimistic hopes for those countries, and following several years of strong growth, they formally came together at the first BRIC summit in 2009. In 2010, the bloc underwent its first expansion when South Africa joined. The group’s origins go some way to explaining its highly informal nature, which is based on no formal criteria or charter. While the bloc represented 41% of the global population and 18% of global trade before its most recent expansion in 2023, it is not entirely clear what it represents beyond “an alternative”.

It has some formal tools at its disposal, such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank (NDB). The latter of which has under-performed, lending only 1/3 of the World Bank’s commitments in a single year (2021) in 8 years of the NDB’s existence. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement exists to facilitate swaps in the event of a balance of payments crisis, yet has never actually been used. For most of its short history, the group has also failed to achieve its potential economically. Sluggish growth and politically erratic behaviour have hampered Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. While India and China performed better over the last decade and a half, the latter’s economy looks decidedly shaky as of late. The replacement of a politburo of competent technocrats with loyalists (of whom some, but fewer, are still technocrats) has amplified challenges to an economy still reeling from the world’s most severe pandemic lockdowns. Boisterous geopolitical manoeuvring has compounded the issue further, driving clients of China’s massive industrial capacity to consider relocation to friendlier, more predictable shores.

India seems to be the bright spot of the bloc. Its economy continues to grow at a comfortable pace, giving the world’s largest democracy a growing degree of global clout. That said, concerns over increasingly authoritarian domestic politics from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP persist. While BRICS might seem like a useful antidote to this challenge – after all, Russia and China are unlikely to criticise a fellow member for authoritarian practices – animosity between Beijing and New Delhi has risen sharply in recent years. Following deadly clashes in the Galwan valley, India has embarked on an aggressive campaign to block Chinese firms from accessing its domestic market.

The border disputes remaining unsettled, despite a meeting at the Johannesburg summit in August 2023 between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Modi where the issue was discussed. No real delineation plan has emerged, and with India’s elections looming in 2024, the temptation by the Hindutva-focused BJP to stir up nationalist tensions along the border will likely be too great to avoid. Animosity between the two main economic heavyweights of the bloc is therefore unlikely to abate. The Indian public is increasingly suspicious of China, seeing it as a more significant threat than Pakistan for the first time. Its military elite shares this view. This has driven significant hesitation in India over the expansion of BRICS, with fears that China – which dominates the bloc due to the sheer size of its economy – would wield more global influence. This comes at a time when India is courting closer military ties with the US, precisely as a counterbalance to China.

Any form of closer defence integration by BRICS members is therefore unlikely. Following the lacklustre performance of Russian military hardware in its invasion of Ukraine, India – which previously purchased around 70% of its equipment from Russia – has begun turning to suppliers such as France and the US. Shortly before the invasion of Ukraine, China declared a no-limits friendship with Moscow, causing Western fears of a major increase of material available to Russia. However, these fears have not materialised, as Beijing has limited its military aid to its ally to discrete shipments. Political alignment seems equally elusive; Putin did not attend the 2023 summit in South Africa out of concern that the International Criminal Court member would be forced to arrest him. While South Africa maintains close ties with Russia – a hangover from the days of the Soviet Union’s support for the ANC – it is mindful of risking its preferential trade status with the US.

The summit itself was also a clumsy affair by all accounts, demonstrating the overall lack of cohesion between members. Reports have suggested that Modi refused to leave his aircraft on arrival because South African President Cyril Ramaphosa didn’t greet him on arrival. Xi’s opening remarks were read out by commerce minister Wang Wentao, although this change was so poorly planned that China’s foreign ministry spokesperson suggested Xi had delivered it himself. Meanwhile, Putin’s address (by video) was comically-dubbed with a “fake voice”, which caused confusion amongst the audience.

And these are the core members; the newly proposed members – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – are unlikely to solve these cohesion issues either. In fact, while their admission to the bloc (although all are yet to accept) is being touted as a triumph over US-led hegemony, the reality is that the majority represent liabilities. The rest may simply be noncommittally dipping their toes into an informal and un-chartered bloc, seeing little to lose, and more options for credit lines.

Of the new member proposals, Iran and Saudi Arabia are locked in a region-spanning cold war for influence across the Gulf, Yemen, and the Levant. This may explain Riyadh’s reluctant signals around joining the bloc. The Saudi foreign minister indicated that his country had not yet decided on whether to join, appreciating the invitation but “…waiting for more details from the group on the nature of membership.” Saudi Arabia has long sought to keep Iran isolated internationally, and is unlikely to be happy about a joint invitation to the bloc. Argentina and Egypt, meanwhile, represent two of the globe’s most troubled economies. Ethiopia sits on the brink of civil war, having long faded from its days as an African economic success story.

The UAE is probably the most meaningful proposal (until Saudi Arabia’s hesitancy evaporates). Politically and economically stable, it is undergoing a process of divergence from its position as one of the US’ closest regional allies (garnering the nickname “little Sparta”). It has benefited from an influx of Russian cash and other economic benefits following Western sanctions against Moscow, and as such, the bloc likely offers a further opportunity to chart a more independent foreign policy course. Like Saudi Arabia, however, the UAE is almost entirely dependent on expensive NATO military equipment and spare parts; a fact that would take years to resolve should it decide to retool.

Indonesia was reportedly also offered membership, turning it down citing its existing commitments to the ASEAN bloc; a relatively flimsy excuse that likely represents Jakarta’s desire to remain neutral, as well as scepticism of the benefits of aligning with a belligerent Russia and an economically-stagnating China.

Despite all of these challenges, it is clear that much of the developing world is deeply frustrated with the post-Bretton Woods international order. BRICS – or as it may soon be known BRICSAEEISU – offers a low-commitment alternative, offering second- and third-tier powers a chance for a bigger voice in international affairs. International (mostly Western) sanctions on Russia, which involved seizing foreign currency reserves and cutting off Moscow’s access to SWIFT, have served as a reminder that the current economic order is contingent on adherence to the Western rules-based order. For most states – especially those with belligerent neighbours – this is seen as a valuable method of maintaining a semblance of global order and fairness. For others, however, this is perceived as a Sword of Damocles, stopping states from acting in a truly independent manner; set aside that such independent policy usually involves antidemocratic practices, unilateral aggression, and other unpleasantness.

BRICS represents a collection of fragile countries mixed in with a couple of stable ones, and is riven with internal contradictions. These will likely hinder its growth into anything more significant than an alternative loan and bailout system, and a platform for airing grievances against Western-dominated institutions. Despite this, its expansion (and even larger waiting list) is a clear signal that the Western-led system needs an overhaul, and needs to pay attention to voices from the so-called “Global South”. If it fails to do so, it cannot be surprised that nations seek even deeply flawed alternatives. While the West may console itself in the lacklustre economics of the bloc, and divisions between member states, it must still take note of the challenge it poses.

Although cohesion does not appear to be a natural outcome for such a mix, contrarianism is a powerful force, and BRICS/BRICSAEEISU may prove surprisingly aerodynamic. If the West’s plan is to outlast the bloc, it may be waiting for some time. To paraphrase the wonderful Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, the bloc may hang “…in the sky in much the same way that BRICS don’t.”

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Dr Lewis Sage-Passant is a researcher in the field of intelligence and espionage, and a former Military Intelligence Officer. Lewis is an adjunct professor in intelligence at Sciences Po Paris, and has extensive experience working and living in the Middle East and North Africa and Asia Pacific regions in a variety of geopolitical analysis and intelligence roles across the energy industry, the financial sector, leading technology firms, and the pharmaceuticals sector.