Why America Still Needs Europe

Authored by foreignaffairs.com and submitted by BlueEmma25
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The war in Ukraine has sparked a puzzling development in U.S. national security thinking. At the same time as U.S.-European cooperation has surged, an influential group of American scholars, analysts, and commentators have begun pressing the United States to prepare to radically scale back its commitment to Europe. The basic idea is not new: restraint-oriented realists such as Emma Ashford, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt have long called for the United States to rethink its security posture in Europe.

Now, however, they have been joined by an influential band of China hawks, led by former Pentagon official Elbridge Colby, who argue that the United States must curb its European commitments. The main contest, this group believes, is in the Indo-Pacific, against China—and Washington must focus all its resources on that confrontation.

The specific wishes of these realists and hawks are often vague, combining ill-defined cuts to U.S. forces in Europe with demands for Europe to step up its own security, although without necessarily calling on Washington to ditch NATO outright. But if the United States is to reduce its obligations to NATO, to go all-in on the China threat, as they argue it should, it will have to slash its forces in Europe and at least raise the possibility of pulling away from the alliance.

On a conceptual level, this idea is bold and thought-provoking. In theory, by empowering allies to take the lead in Europe and liberating U.S. resources for use in Asia, Washington can significantly bolster its Indo-Pacific posture. But a closer look at the dynamics in play shows how self-defeating such a shift would be in practice. Instead of strengthening Washington’s hand in Asia, the result could be to badly weaken the United States in its growing competition with China.

To begin with, the tradeoff between Europe and the Indo-Pacific is not nearly as great as some skeptics suggest. The military needs of the two regions are quite different. The Indo-Pacific, because of its vast distances and maritime orientation, primarily taxes U.S. air and sea assets (though land forces have essential roles); Europe calls for more muscular land power. Both theaters do place demands on common capabilities, including air and missile defense, and advanced munitions, but the Defense Department is now buying more, and allies can help in these areas. In any event, the United States should not be judging the tradeoff against some mythical ability to fight two massive, simultaneous wars, but whether it can sustain a credible peacetime posture in both theaters.

The long-standing charge that the United States needlessly lavishes resources on Europe is also mistaken. In 2018, for example, one estimate of the total cost of U.S. contributions to NATO budgets, U.S. forces in Europe, European Deterrence Initiative programs, and security assistance came to about $36 billion, which was less than six percent of the U.S. defense budget that year. With the Biden administration’s decision to deploy roughly 20,000 additional troops to Europe after February 2022, that bill has grown, but only temporarily. The 2024 defense budget is $842 billion, of which the United States’ European commitments represent only a small fraction.

Advocates of disengagement from Europe often ignore an uncomfortable fact. The only way to save significantly on European commitments would be for the United States to take the most extreme and risky step of leaving NATO—a step few if any of the Europe critics recommend. It would, however, be necessary: no other measure would lead to big reductions. If, for example, the United States were to seek merely to reduce its presence in Europe but stay in NATO, it would still need to maintain sufficient forces and capabilities to fulfill its NATO obligations. The U.S. defense bill would not shrink by much.

China is most likely to attack Taiwan if it becomes desperate.

U.S. interests preclude any complete separation from Europe. Consider what would happen if the United States were to leave NATO to focus on the Indo-Pacific, and then Russia decided to attack one of the Baltic countries or Poland. It is inconceivable that a U.S. president could sit by and do nothing as Europe fought for its life against a brutal autocrat. Such inaction would be particularly implausible if Russia were getting major help from China, the very power that the United States had pivoted to challenge. If a European war will almost certainly draw in the United States, then the best way to avoid massive cost and risk is not to penny-pinch on peacetime commitments. The most cost-effective option is to stay, strengthen existing alliances, and keep war from happening in the first place. Moreover, the growing partnership between Russia and China means that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are now inextricably linked. However much the United States may wish to prioritize one region over the other, backing off from Europe will empower Russia, China’s primary partner and ally, even as it feeds Beijing’s narratives about U.S. decline and the triumph of autocracy.

The proposal to move troops from Europe to reinforce the Indo-Pacific misreads the requirements for deterrence. China is most likely to attack Taiwan if it becomes desperate, believing it will lose any hope of unification if it fails to act. At such a moment, Beijing is unlikely to be deterred by modest additional capabilities shifted from Europe. Indeed, such a redeployment could easily spark Chinese escalation by signaling the beginning of a more determined phase of U.S. efforts to “contain” China. In other words, the dramatic demonstration of U.S. disengagement from Europe to reinforce its military presence in the Indo-Pacific could well induce war rather than deter it.

The United States also derives diverse benefits from NATO membership that contribute directly to its global military effectiveness, including in the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s cooperation with European allies in areas including coordinated ballistic missile defense operations enhances capabilities that the United States can use to address threats beyond Europe. U.S. participation in NATO exercises—for example, training in Arctic areas with Finnish and Norwegian troops or practicing amphibious operations with Sweden—improves U.S. forces’ skills. NATO’s vigorous response to other kinds of threats, including disinformation campaigns, has generated insights that inform U.S. and partner responses elsewhere through intelligence sharing, joint planning and exercises, and combined analysis. NATO allies are also developing capabilities for joint intelligence and targeting in a shared battle space, an effort that is likely to offer critical lessons for similar initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, NATO has begun work on combating cyberwarfare, announcing a Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, forming Cyber Rapid Reaction teams, and building a Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia, to share intelligence, develop common plans and norms for cyberdefense, and engage in shared training and exercises.

The advantages that NATO offers Washington, then, are not confined to Europe. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that, in the event of a clash in the Indo-Pacific, the United States would call on NATO for assistance. Although it has often been assumed that the alliance would be a bystander to wars elsewhere, a major conflict with China will challenge those assumptions. As described by defense experts including Jeffrey Engstrom, Mark Cozad, and Tim Heath, Chinese military doctrine calls for paralyzing blows against an enemy’s military, social, and political systems at the outset of war. Such attacks could well reach into the continental United States, which would at least in theory provide grounds for NATO’s leaders to invoke Article 5, requiring the alliance’s other members to come to Washington’s assistance. Indeed, there is a precedent for such a request: NATO invoked Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

The general belief has been—and rightly remains—that European governments will be eager to steer clear of a U.S.-China conflict. This desire was made plain by French President Emmanuel Macron’s statement in early April that Europe should not get “caught up in crises that are not ours.” But a massive strike on U.S. forces or on the United States itself may leave European leaders with little choice but to help in some way. And over the last few years, America’s European allies have edged closer to open support for U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Several NATO members, including Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have sent ships to the Indo-Pacific. In 2021 alone, there were 21 such deployments. NATO has also been deepening its institutional partnerships with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea in recognition of the Chinese threat. Not all of these deployments are surprising. France has long had a presence in the Indo-Pacific and still has over 7,000 troops there. The United Kingdom also has historic ties to the region, and its membership, with Australia and the United States, in the trilateral security pact AUKUS has bound it directly to Indo-Pacific security. Formal NATO strategy documents have been increasingly explicit in identifying China as a threat.

Washington cannot expect governments to place their trust in a nation that breaches its commitments.

These commitments remain highly conditional, and NATO members, with smaller navies and air forces and persistent European and Mediterranean responsibilities, could send only modest forces to the Indo-Pacific. Even in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, many European allies may well choose to restrict their help to noncombat roles. But such support can be critical in numerous ways: sharing intelligence; cooperating in cyberdefense; ramping up production of munitions; providing logistical, medical, and other support functions; and potentially deploying symbolic units to other Indo-Pacific countries. Such assistance could relieve the United States of other responsibilities, fill gaps, and send powerful signals about a unified response to any further aggression.

Close coordination with Europe is also critical to the United States’ efforts to oppose China’s campaign to dominate the norms, rules, and institutions of the international system. The United States cannot do this alone. European support on many emerging issues—from climate and cyber threats to artificial intelligence—will be essential to ensure that these norms are not set in ways that undermine shared interests. True some level of cooperation would continue were the United States to leave the alliance. But the injured prestige, feelings of abandonment, and political blowback that would erupt if Washington were perceived to be cutting Europe loose would make disenchanted European governments more determined to carve out a course independent of U.S. goals. Finally others will be watching any U.S. uncoupling from Europe, and drawing their own conclusions. Washington could hardly expect Indo-Pacific governments to place their trust in a nation that had breached its commitments to its staunchest allies. Beijing would doubt whether a United States that had deserted Europe would really make good on its pledge to defend Taiwan.

The proposal to disengage the United States from Europe misreads the current strategic moment. Since World War II, the United States has made the case for its international role as the sponsor of a shared order of mutual benefit. After two decades of threats to U.S. standing—from Iraq to the financial crisis, “America first” to Afghanistan—coordinating responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine has reaffirmed the value of American leadership.

Stripping, or even significantly downgrading, the United States’ European commitments would demolish much of this accumulated legitimacy. It would validate the grim picture that China and Russia now paint of a United States that is pitilessly self-interested and transactional, and would severely undermine the United States’ painstaking attempts to build a reputation as that rare great power that offers something to the world other than naked ambition. The country’s chief competitive advantage in the contest with China is its dominant global network of friends and allies. Now is the time to strengthen those coveted ties—in Europe and elsewhere.

kkdogs19 on May 29th, 2023 at 00:31 UTC »

This is a massive strawman. There is nothing about NATO that necessitates the need for 100,000+ US troops in Europe with all the resource that takes to sustain. We aren't going to invade Russia and they sure as hell aren't in a position to widen the war whilst they're bogged down in Ukraine.

chengbaofangan on May 28th, 2023 at 23:54 UTC »

The arguments about withdrawing from Europe assume that Russia is the only threat to American interests in Europe. It's not.

Germany will always be on the American radar as a state capable of establishing regional hegemony. Alternatively, a Franco-German condominium could turn the EU into an exclusive hegemonic bloc for those two. Keeping Europe reliant and allied with the US prevents both those scenarios.

BlueEmma25 on May 28th, 2023 at 22:36 UTC »

Michael Mazarr - "Why America Still Needs Europe - The False Promise of an 'Asia First' Approach" Unpaywalled Version

Ashford, Shifrinson, and Wertheim - "Does American Still Need Europe? Debating the 'Asian First' Approach" Unpaywalled Version

Submission Statement:

In these two articles from Foreign Affairs - the second is a response to the first - American IR scholars debate the merits of maintaining a continued military presence in Europe.

In the first article RAND Corporation's Michael Mazarr makes the case that the US military should continue to remain active in Europe even as America's strategic focus becomes increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region and the challenge China poses to the geopolitical status quo. He points out the emerging alliance between what he calls "restraint-oriented realists", who broadly favour a reduction in American overseas commitments, and China hawks who believe that as the "pacing challenge" the US needs to prioritize China and the diversion of significant resources to Europe is unnecessary and contrary to America's strategic interests.

In support of his position Mazarr points out that the American military presence in Europe is only a fraction of what it was during the Cold War and represents a relatively small portion of the defence budget. He further points out that the US needs European cooperation on a host of issues like climate change, cybersecurity and (not least of all) managing the rise of China, and a radical change in America's force posture on the continent could prompt Europe to re-evaluate the relationship and seek a more independent direction. He also makes a cogent strategic argument for continued engagement: even if the US withdrew, it would almost certainly be drawn back in if a major war broke out on the continent. Therefore the best policy for the US is to engage in deterrence by maintaining some forces in Europe and reducing the risk of such an eventuality (conversely he argues deploying large numbers of new forces to the Pacific could actually provoke China to launch an early invasion of Taiwan as it sees the correlation of forces in the region moving in an unfavourable direction).

The second article was written in response to the first by three of what Mazarr calls "restraint orientated realists": Emma Ashford (Georgetown, Stimson Center), Joshua Shifrinson (Maryland, Cato Institute) and Stephen Wertheim (Catholic University, Yale Law, Carnegie Endowment). The three argue that Europe can and should accept most of the responsibility for its own defence, with the US limiting itself to a (very vaguely defined) supporting role, and argue this would actually strengthen the alliance by making it more of a partnership between equals. The point to the poor performance of the Russian army in the initial stages of the Ukraine invasion as further reason to believe security threats in Europe are exaggerated.

They also plead resource poverty, in that the US no longer has sufficient forces to fight two major wars simultaneously: "Although policymakers talk about deterring both China and Russia indefinitely, the 2018 National Defense Strategy effectively abandoned plans for the United States to maintain forces sufficient to fight wars in two regions — let alone against two major powers — at once."

The second article includes a rebuttal by Mazarr that is well worth reading. His principle criticisms are: first, he points out that Ashford, Shifrinson and Wertheim offer no concrete proposals for how US commitments to Europe should be restructured or what the desired "end state" of such a restructuring would look like. He also takes them to task for failing to consider the potential impact of such a restructuring on American-European relations:

They also do not specify whether the United States should take the most extreme step and leave NATO. This ambiguity leaves them in a strategic no man’s land, urging cuts to U.S. forces in Europe but allowing for some lasting military role, staying in NATO (it appears) but hinting at bolder moves later. Such an ambiguous position risks undermining deterrence and threatening the credibility of U.S. global promises without producing the outcomes that the authors want.

Second, he reiterates that the US has already very significantly restructured and reduced its military presence in Europe since the end of the Cold War and calls for further major restructuring should be evaluated in light of this fact.

Third, he points to the following passage from the Ashford, Shifrinson and Wertheim article:

Acting as Europe’s protector fuels U.S. hubris and allows Washington to discount the often valuable advice of its friends. When western European governments spoke out against the war in Iraq in 2003, they were ignored even though they were right. If Europe had greater strategic autonomy, Washington would be less prone to engage in the fantasy that the United States alone can shape the world as it wants.

He goes on to suggest that the authors may be allowing their antipathy to American military adventurism and extensive overseas commitments to colour their perceptions of the desirability of reducing commitments to Europe without considering the specific merits of the case in question: it might be true that it desirable to the US to reduce its global commitments overall while recognizing that in the specific case of Europe the strategic costs of such a reduction potentially outweigh the benefits.