The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality

There is a widespread cross-cultural stereotype suggesting that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. Is there any truth to this notion? Building on theory about the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, the present research investigated whether there are reliable similarities as well as differences between believers and disbelievers in the moral values and principles they endorse. Four studies examined how religious disbelief (vs. belief) relates to endorsement of various moral values and principles in a predominately religious (vs. irreligious) country (the U.S. vs. Sweden). Two U.S. M-Turk studies (Studies 1A and 1B, N = 429) and two large cross-national studies (Studies 2–3, N = 4,193), consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in endorsement of other moral values (individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality). It is also demonstrated that presumed cultural and demotivational antecedents of disbelief (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat) are associated with disbelief. Furthermore, these factors are associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries (Study 2). Most of these findings were replicated in Study 3, and results also show that disbelievers (vs. believers) have a more consequentialist view of morality in both countries. A consequentialist view of morality was also associated with another presumed antecedent of disbelief—analytic cognitive style.

Over the last 40 years, we have seen dramatic improvements in (explicit) attitudes toward most racial and religious minorities in the U.S. Improvements in attitudes toward atheists, however, appear to be lagging behind [1]. According to a Pew poll from 2019, Americans have a more unfavorable attitude toward atheists (and Muslims) than toward any other religious group [2]. Furthermore, whereas 93 to 96 percent of Americans reported being willing to vote for a qualified African American, Catholic, or Jewish presidential candidate in 2019, only 60 percent were willing to vote for a qualified atheist candidate [3].

Psychologists have recently started to examine why people have such antipathy toward atheists, and the findings strongly suggest that prejudice against atheists is driven by distrust [4–8]. According to a Pew poll from 2019, 44% of Americans think that belief in God is necessary for morality [9]. Distrust of atheists appears to stem from two related yet distinct concerns. First, people worry that atheists do not share their moral norms and values. In fact, atheists form the social group that Americans believe to be least in agreement with their vision of America [1]. Second, even if atheists were to have a general sense of right and wrong, people still worry that they would engage in immoral behavior because they do not believe in a monitoring God [7]. Notably, these concerns are not restricted to Americans or even to religious people. A recent study found strong evidence for the negative stereotype about atheists as immoral in 11 out of 13 countries investigated, and this stereotype was subscribed to even by atheists themselves [8].

Is there any validity to these widespread concerns about atheists having different moral standards than theists? The present research addresses this question by examining the extent to which disbelievers consider various values and principles relevant for morality, and to what extent their moral values and principles are similar to or different from those of religious believers. Results from a total of four studies are reported, including two large cross-national studies, comparing data from a country where religious belief is the norm (the U.S.), to data from one of the most secular countries in the world (Sweden). The central message in this article is that disbelievers do have a moral compass, but that it is calibrated somewhat differently than the one used by religious believers. Furthermore, suggestive evidence is provided, indicating that differences between disbelievers and believers regarding the moral values and principles they endorse may be attributable to the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of their (dis)belief.

Does religious belief promote morality? Researchers have primarily addressed whether religious belief promotes morality by investigating the relationship between religiosity on the one hand, and the inclination to engage in various behaviors that are considered moral or immoral on the other. The results of this enterprise have been mixed. Although religiosity seems to be positively related to some morally relevant behaviors, it appears to be unrelated or negatively related to others [10–15]. Furthermore, acting in a way that can be considered moral does not imply that the behavior was morally motivated. Various other considerations, such as reputational concerns and ingroup favoritism, may also explain observed differences in morally relevant behavior [16, 17]. Similarly, acting in a way that can be considered immoral does not rule out that the behavior was morally motivated. History is full of examples of seemingly highly immoral acts that appear to have been driven by moral motives. For example, the 9/11 attacks, and the Oklahoma City bombing, seemed to be driven by strong moral convictions. In fact, some scholars have argued that most human violence is driven by moral motives [18]. An exhaustive review of the literature on the links between religiosity and moral behavior is far beyond the scope of this article. Instead, to illustrate the points raised above, I focus on two relevant areas of research—charity donations and prejudice—that suggest opposite relationships between religiosity and moral behavior. In an extensive review of the literature on charity donations [11], Bekkers and Wiepking concluded that there are positive relationships between factors such as church attendance and religiosity on the one hand, and donations to charity on the other. However, they also noted that controlled experimental studies where donations are given in private rather than in public, and to secular rather than to specific religious organizations, have generally found no relationship between religiosity and charitable donations. Bekkers and Wiepking’s review suggests that the relationship between religiosity and charitable donations is likely to be explained to a considerable degree by factors such as the frequency with which one is solicited to donate (church attendants are more frequently solicited [19]), whether solicitation occurs in public [11], and whether the charity is associated with one’s ingroup (e.g., religious organization). Notably, religiosity has been linked to both ingroup favoritism [20–22] and impression management [23]. Thus, rather than implying that irreligious people are less morally sensitive to the plight of those in need, their weaker inclination to donate to charities may be due to various other factors, such as weaker reputational concerns, less ingroup favoritism, or less exposure to donation requests [24, 25]. A second morally relevant domain for which the role of religiosity has been examined is that of prejudice and discrimination toward minorities and stigmatized groups. Research in this area suggests that religiosity is associated with prejudice toward different minority groups. Specifically, religiosity is positively related to antipathy toward atheists [7, 8], racial minorities [12], and homosexuals [14]. One possible explanation of these findings is that religious people rely less on moral considerations than the nonreligious when they evaluate these minority groups. Alternatively, the religious may simply rely on different moral considerations than the nonreligious, and specific minority groups may be perceived as threats to religious’ people’s moral values, but not to the moral values of the nonreligious. For example, homosexuals may be perceived as a threat to traditional moral values about marriage and sex [26], whereas atheists may be perceived as a threat to the religious moral community more generally [1, 7]. As the examples above illustrate, the relationships between religiosity and morally relevant attitudes and behaviors can go in either direction, depending on the specific morally relevant attitude or behavior under examination. Furthermore, seemingly morally relevant attitudes and behaviors can be driven by a whole range of moral as well as amoral considerations. It therefore seems that a more fruitful way to start investigating the relationship between religious disbelief and morality is to examine the similarities and differences between believers and disbelievers in the extent to which they view various values and principles as relevant and important for morality. To the extent that differences in moral values and principles between believers and disbelievers are found, researchers can then turn to investigate their behavioral consequences, along with the consequences of various amoral considerations. The present research investigates whether disbelievers differ from believers in how they conceptualize morality. An underlying assumption is that, to the extent that disbelievers’ views of morality are different from those of believers, these differences are unlikely to be attributable to religious disbelief itself. Rather, any unique aspects of disbelievers’ views of morality are expected to be attributable to the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive factors that caused their disbelief. I shall therefore begin by discussing recent insights about the antecedents of religious disbelief. These insights are then integrated with current theorizing in moral psychology to generate a set of hypotheses about how moral values and principles may differ between disbelievers and believers.

Antecedents of religious disbelief Cognitive scientists have proposed four different processes through which people can become religious disbelievers [27]. First, religious beliefs are thought to be powerfully culturally transmitted through so-called credibility-enhancing displays (CREDs). Children are more likely to accept certain religious beliefs as true to the extent that they observe important others in their community engage in behaviors in the service of those beliefs, that would be personally costly if the beliefs were false (e.g., attend religious meetings, perform demanding religious rituals, engage in pro-social behavior). By contrast, to the extent that such CREDs are absent in the community while growing up, children are far less likely to adopt any religious beliefs even if their parents are religious [28, 29]. Thus, an absence of CREDs in the community is thought to constitute a path to religious disbelief. Second, scholars have long argued that belief in a powerful deity can provide a sense of compensatory control and comfort during times of suffering and existential uncertainty [27]. Experimental studies support this notion, as manipulations of suffering [30], mortality salience [31, 32], loneliness [33], and loss of control [34, 35], each strengthen religious belief. Moreover, religious belief is stronger in countries associated with high levels of child mortality, poverty, and various indicators of societal instability [30, 36]. By contrast, religious disbelief is most prevalent in the Scandinavian countries, the safest and most stable region in the world [36, 37]. Thus, growing up in an environment where there are low levels of (perceived) existential threat/uncertainty should reduce the motivation to believe in powerful deities, and thereby provide a possible path to disbelief. Third, people can reason themselves into religious disbelief [27]. To the extent that religious belief is reliant on various intuitive (System 1) social cognitive processes, an inclination to over-ride such processes with more analytic (System 2) thinking could reduce religious belief. Consistent with this line of reasoning, multiple labs have documented a reliable negative relationship between analytic cognitive style (ACS) and religious belief in North America [38–40]. A recent meta-analysis (k = 31, N > 15,000) found that this relationship is reliable (albeit weak [41]). However, the relationship between ACS and religious disbelief appears to primarily hold up in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries [42]. One possible explanation for this finding is that the relationship between ACS and religious disbelief may depend on the strength of cultural norms to believe in God. For example, the relationship between ACS and religious disbelief may fail to emerge in cultures where norms to believe in God are very strong [43]. Alternatively, the relationship between ACS and religious disbelief may be curvilinear. That is, the relationship may disappear when cultural norms to believe in God are either very strong, or when there are no cultural norms to believe in God (and thus no intuitive beliefs for analytic thinking to override). Finally, it has also been proposed that belief in a deity may rely on mentalizing abilities [27]. According to this line of thought, people who struggle to understand other people’s intentions and mental states (e.g., individuals on the autism spectrum), should also have a hard time conceptualizing an invisible, supernatural agent. As a consequence, individuals with low mentalizing abilities may be less inclined to believe in God. To date, however, the evidence in support for the relationship between mentalizing abilities and religious belief is weak. Although some studies have found a link between mentalizing abilities and belief in a personal God [44], a recent set of very large cross-national studies (N > 67,000) failed to find any relationships between religious belief and several validated measures of mentalizing abilities [29]. Thus, it seems implausible that mentalizing deficits serve as a reliable antecedent of religious disbelief. In summary, there appear to be at least three plausible contributors to religious disbelief: a lack of exposure to CREDs in the community while growing up, living under conditions of low existential threat, and a reliance on an analytic (vs. intuitive) cognitive style should all increase the likelihood of becoming a disbeliever. In the following sections I connect these insights to the literature on moral psychology, and postulate a set of tentative hypotheses about how each of these factors may contribute to disbelievers’ views on morality.

Antecedents of disbelief and the moral foundations How do the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief reviewed above shape people’s views about morality? To address this question, I rely on the conceptualization of the moral domain provided by Moral Foundations Theory [45, 46]. Although this theory is not without its critics [47–49] it is arguably the most ambitious, and most frequently used taxonomy of human moral values. It is therefore a suitable theoretical framework for the purposes of the present research. According to MFT, the human moral domain consists of (at least) five foundations: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation. All of the moral foundations are thought to be the result of evolutionary processes, yet their significance as well as their manifestations are viewed as highly responsive to cultural influence. Thus, societies as well as individuals are expected to differ in the extent to which they view each of the foundations as relevant for morality, as well as in how those foundations manifest themselves in specific moral attitudes and behavior. The Care/harm and Fairness/cheating foundations are thought to serve to protect the well-being of vulnerable individuals, and are therefore referred to as individualizing moral foundations. By contrast, the proposed main function of Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation is to protect the integrity of the group, and these foundations are therefore conceptualized as binding moral foundations. Graham and Haidt have argued that a core function of religion is to bind group members together into cohesive communities [21]. Based on this line of reasoning, believers (vs. disbelievers) should be more inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). Consistent with this analysis, there is some evidence that religious commitment is positively associated with endorsement of all of the binding foundations, and that these associations remain when controlling for political orientation [50]. But how do these values spread through the religious community? One possible answer to that question is that the binding moral foundations may transfer to younger generations through exposure to various CREDs that signal the fundamental importance ascribed to the religious community. As stated above, religious CREDs are behaviors performed in the service of specific religious beliefs, that would be personally costly if the beliefs were false. CREDs thereby signal the importance and credibility of those beliefs. Notably, however, many CREDs simultaneously signal the individual’s commitment to the community (donations, volunteer work), and to the cohesiveness of that community (attending religious meetings, public religious rituals, engaging in religious chants). It therefore seems plausible that CREDs not only increase the credibility of specific religious beliefs, but also the perceived moral significance of the community and the binding moral foundations themselves. By contrast, to the extent that CREDs are absent in the community in which people grow up, people should be less inclined to believe in God—and may also be less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations. There is also evidence that various existential threats promote group cohesion and ingroup favoritism, and might therefore also contribute to the moral significance ascribed to the binding moral foundations. For example, manipulations of mortality salience increase ingroup favoritism [51] and nationalistic bias [52]. In a similar vein, threats to one’s need to belong [53], and one’s sense of personal control [34], increase conformity and support for the national government, respectively. Finally, there is some direct evidence that individual differences in belief in a dangerous world predict endorsement of the binding moral foundations [54]. Based on this literature, low (vs. high) levels of existential threat should make people less inclined to believe in God—and less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations. There is also some empirical evidence that individual differences in ACS contribute to the perceived significance of the binding moral foundations. Specifically, individuals with a more analytic (vs. intuitive) cognitive style have been found to be somewhat less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations, and to view disgusting (but harmless) acts as less immoral [55, 56]. Based on these initial findings, individuals who score high (vs. low) on ACS should be less inclined to believe in God—and less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations. Finally, mentalizing abilities are closely associated with the ability to empathize with and be concerned about victims of misfortune. Higher (vs. lower) mentalizing abilities should therefore be associated with stronger endorsement of the moral foundations that center on the well-being on individuals (the individualizing moral foundations). However, as stated earlier, the bulk of the evidence suggests that mentalizing abilities are unrelated to religious belief. Thus, although low (vs. high) mentalizing abilities should be associated with weaker endorsement of the individualizing moral foundations, it seems implausible that individual differences in mentalizing abilities should produce differences in endorsement of the individualizing moral foundations between believers and disbelievers. To summarize, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that a relative absence of CREDs, low levels of existential threat in the community, as well as high ACS should all serve to constrain the scope of the moral domain by attenuating the moral significance ascribed to the binding moral foundations. Because lower levels of CREDs, lower existential threat, and higher ACS are expected to promote disbelief, there are also reasons to suspect that these factors may contribute to weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations among disbelievers (vs. believers). In addition, lower mentalizing abilities should constrain the moral domain by reducing the moral significance ascribed to the well-being of vulnerable individuals (the individualizing foundations). However, because the empirical evidence speaks against a link between mentalizing abilities and religious belief, there is no reason to expect any differences in endorsement of the individualizing moral foundations between believers and disbelievers. In the following section I go beyond the moral foundations and discuss how antecendents of disbelief may contribute to differences between believers and disbelievers in the processes through which they make moral judgments, as well as in the extent to which they view epistemic rationality as a moral issue.

Beyond the moral foundations: Consequentialist thinking and moralized rationality Multiple studies suggest that religious disbelief is associated with a more consequentialist view of morality. Specifically, disbelievers are more inclined to judge the appropriateness of actions based on their consequences relative to the consequences of inaction [57–59]. There are reasons to suspect that this relationship may be attributable to differences in ACS, because a reliance on more analytic (System 2) cognitive processes is associated with a tendency to make consequentialist moral judgments [57, 60–63]. Based on this line of reasoning, individuals who score high (vs. low) on ACS should not only be less inclined to believe in God, but also be more inclined to endorse a consequentialist view of morality. Finally, religious disbelief has also been linked to moralization of epistemic rationality itself. Specifically, weaker religious belief is associated with viewing reliance on logic and evidence when forming and evaluating beliefs as a moral good [64]. Thus far, no studies have systematically examined where the association between religious disbelief and moralizing epistemic rationality may come from. One possibility is that this relationship is attributable to differences in ACS between believers and disbelievers. To the extent that one is inclined to rely on analytic thinking, one may also be more inclined to view this cognitive style as morally superior to alternative ways of forming and evaluating beliefs. However, the only two studies that included data on both ACS and moralized rationality found no support for that prediction [65]. This possibility will be examined more rigorously in the present research. In summary, there are theoretical as well as empirical reasons to expect disbelievers to be less inclined than believers to endorse the binding moral foundations, and we propose that this difference may be attributable to varying levels of exposure to CREDs, existential threat, as well as to individual differences in cognitive style. Furthermore, previous research suggests that disbelievers (vs. believers) should be more inclined to endorse a consequentialist (vs. deontological) view of morality, as well as to view epistemic rationality as an important moral value. These two differences between disbelievers and believers may also be attributable to individual differences in cognitive style.