The Daily Populous Wednesday June 24th, 2026 morning edition
Authored by israelhayom.com and submitted by polymute

The signing of the US-Iranian memorandum of understanding points to the emergence of a new regional order, one Israel will not like, but one the Gulf states are already rushing to adapt to.

While Israel will still spend a great deal of time debating why the war failed to achieve its objectives and asking, "What went wrong?" the Gulf states have already internalized the reality: Iran remains a dangerous neighbor and, in some respects, has even emerged from the campaign strengthened. Behind the congratulations from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha over the agreement lies not optimism, but relief that the war has ended and that they can return to focusing on their economic priorities.

For many in Israel, the Gulf states' willingness to resume dialogue with Iran is surprising, since some of them were hurt more than Israel. But precisely for that reason, they are not asking how Iran can be defeated, but how to live alongside it.

To my knowledge, this is one of the central lessons the Gulf states drew from the war: The US is not prepared to invest the resources required to topple the Iranian regime or force it into submission. Once that assumption took hold, the road back to dialogue with Tehran was short. In fact, the war did not change the direction in which the Gulf states were moving, but accelerated a trend that began years ago.

The war worsened the Gulf states' situation. It demonstrated Iran's willingness to block the Strait of Hormuz and strike critical energy infrastructure on their territory. In such a reality, from their perspective, there is no better alternative than maintaining the most normal relations possible with Iran. According to reports, this also includes money from Gulf states being transferred to Iran in order to "buy quiet."

For the Gulf states, economic stability is not merely a desirable goal, but an existential interest. The development visions of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar depend on stability, openness to foreign investors and integration into global markets, and any regional confrontation undermines those foundations.

The results of the war also expose a strategic gap between them and Israel. While the Gulf states have internalized the limits of their own power and the limits of American power, Israel continues to speak the language of war. From their perspective, the renewed rapprochement with Iran does not reflect trust in, or identification with, the regime in Tehran. Quite the opposite. Iran remains their main external threat. But the war illustrated just how difficult it is to eliminate that threat by military means alone, and certainly how risky it is to rely on the US to do so for them.

Therefore, those in Israel hoping that the Gulf states will join an anti-Iranian camp and actively seek to bring down the Iranian regime are likely to be disappointed. Instead, the Gulf states will strengthen their defensive capabilities, diversify their partnerships and return, for lack of any better option, to détente with Iran.

Moreover, a combination of factors could push the Gulf states further away from expanding normalization with Israel. First, many in the Gulf blame Israel for embarking on a military adventure whose security and economic price they were forced to pay. Second, after Iran demonstrated its asymmetric military advantage in the Gulf, its neighbors will have to take its positions into account more than before. Under these circumstances, it will be easier for Tehran to pressure the Gulf states to cool their ties with Israel. Added to this is the Israeli government's ongoing refusal to engage on the Palestinian issue, a matter that remains important in the Arab world, even if at times Israel appears to prefer ignoring it.

The agreement has been signed and the new regional order is beginning to take shape. While Israel will undoubtedly examine options for continuing the struggle against Iran, the Gulf states are already in the day after. In my view, the question they are asking is not how to start another war, but how to prevent one.

NekoCatSidhe on June 24th, 2026 at 03:55 UTC »

Well yes, that’s why Iran targeted them in the first place: they were the weak link in the coalition against them. Willing to host US bases used to attack Iran but unwilling to attack it themselves, highly dependent on regional stability for their economy, and militarily weaker than the rest.

Once Iran had demonstrated how vulnerable they were to Iranian retaliation (whether directly with drones destroying oil/gas installations and hotels in the UAE, or indirectly with the closure of the Strait), it was only a matter of time before they folded. And outside of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, none of them wanted that war in the first place.

It looks like Israel is discovering that while a lot of countries do not like Iran, very few actually see the Iranian regime as the kind of existential threat that would justify the costs of that war. If the regime had actually collapsed in the first few days after being attacked, they would have cheered on the war, but once it became obvious that the regime would not collapse and the war dragged on and its economic costs became apparent, they rapidly turned against it.

And of course, a lot of those countries do not like Israel either. They were US allies, not Israel allies, and once the US wanted to stop the war, they no longer had any reason to pretend they wanted it to continue.

TXDobber on June 24th, 2026 at 00:29 UTC »

I mean the Gulf states were always going to roll over lol, why did anybody expect anything more?

The Gulf states mantra since the beginning of their existence has been “take the path of least resistance”… and a hot war with Iran is the opposite of that.

polymute on June 24th, 2026 at 00:03 UTC »

Submission statement:

The right-wing, generally Pro-Netanyahu Israel Hayom newspaper in Israel has published this op-ed/analysis piece. The author argues that the GCC countries now see a new geopolitical map with Iran much stronger. Even though they were hit harder than Israel these countries are very willing to get back to business as usual or even better if possible with Iran at the possible expense of the Abraham Accords and their relationships with Israel. The reason: they need to live with Iran. And this war has ended with Iran in a stronger geopolitical situation. The GCC countries would do very much not to have the Hormuz strait be an unstable passage.