close Cancel email WhatsApp link share Share bookmark Save
When Western observers discuss threats to Vladimir Putin’s regime, they usually focus on two scenarios: an elite split and the disintegration of Russia.
Both are highly unlikely today. The elite remains consolidated around Putin, while Western sanctions have left its members with few alternatives. As for Russia’s many regions, the Kremlin combines tight control over local elites with well-tested mechanisms for responding rapidly to periodic crises. The regime itself remains resilient, adaptive and capable of reallocating resources when necessary.
The regime’s Achilles’ heel lies elsewhere. As a long-time watcher of the Russian elites and a former adviser to the Russian Parliament, government and presidency, I have studied how Putin has transformed, centralised and bolstered his rule, particularly since his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The true weakness of his regime lies in its dependence on manual control and its inability to reproduce itself. Putin’s system of governance and elite recruitment lacks an embedded mechanism of succession and renewal. It is essentially a one-off model. As long as Putin can personally allocate resources, balance competing interests and make key decisions, and as long as the layer immediately beneath him consists of associates he has known for 20-30 years and more, the system remains functional. The problem is that both Putin and most of his closest associates are now in their seventies. Some senior figures, including two consecutive chairpersons of the Supreme Court, have died in office.
The system Putin built has exhausted much of its potential. Unable to renew itself organically, it requires a fundamental overhaul.
Putin chairs a meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects at the Kremlin (Photo: Alexander Miridonov/AFP)
To avoid a sudden systemic breakdown caused by a shortage of fresh personnel, the Kremlin launched a large-scale reshuffle at the beginning of Putin’s new presidential term in 2024–25. These changes can be viewed as the beginning of a peculiar form of transition: the personalist leader remains in place but radically reshapes the team around him, and with it the broader political architecture.
The objective is to preserve power in Putin’s hands while altering the configuration of the political system. The Russian President is gradually relieved of routine management responsibilities while retaining ultimate control. Traditional elite clans are pushed away from real power. In their place come not individual successors but entire cohorts: members of the next generation, presidential aides, family members and the children of Putin’s longtime associates. The old guard weakens while new, carefully vetted and highly loyal groups gain influence.
Under this model, Putin does not leave the presidency when his current term expires. Indeed, the logic of the transition excludes the emergence of a genuine successor. Instead, a collective vice-presidency is being formed from younger members of the elite, all of whom remain dependent on Putin and responsive to his instructions. Putin himself would retain the role of supreme arbiter and strategist, including through the State Council, which brings together the heads of Russia’s key governing institutions.
The transition now under way amounts to putting the system on autopilot. Patriarch Putin would concern himself only with strategic decisions: the long-term development of the armed forces, Arctic expansion, major space programmes, large-scale infrastructure projects and relations with the West. Routine governance would increasingly be delegated to trusted younger lieutenants operating within previously approved programmes and strategies.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Russian Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Anton Vaino, Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin attend a Victory Day military parade at Red Square in Moscow (Photo: Pavel Bednyakov/AFP)
The shift towards this new model is proceeding in stages. The reorganisation of the executive branch in 2024 was followed by the restructuring of the Supreme Court and, more broadly, the judicial system in 2025. This year, the State Duma – and potentially the Federation Council (the upper chamber), given the large number of regional elections – will undergo renewal. State corporations, both economic and security-related, are likely to follow. By the 2030 election cycle, the entire governing system is expected not only to have been refreshed but also tested in practice.
The transition, however, carries substantial risks. Putin has initiated a complex and potentially dangerous process in the midst of a war because the alternative – preserving the existing configuration without renewal – poses an even greater threat to the system he has built. If successful, the transition could make the regime more resilient. During the process itself, however, vulnerability inevitably increases.
Weakening established elite groups and powerful institutional networks is bound to provoke resistance. To contain such resistance, the Kremlin has increasingly relied on political repression within the elite. By our estimates, annual repression rates among the highest federal-level elite now reach approximately 2–4 per cent. Excluding the Great Terror of 1937–38, this corresponds roughly to the average level of elite repression during the Joseph Stalin period.
These repressions function as a form of anaesthesia during a major political operation. Yet anaesthesia carries risks. Too much can paralyse the system; too little can allow events to escape control.
Members of the Wagner group in Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia in June 2023 amid an armed mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin (Photo: AFP/ Getty)
Any major external shock – military setbacks, an end to the war, a large-scale terrorist attack or a global economic crisis – could disrupt or even derail the transition. Should that happen, the Putin model may fail to extend its lifespan through controlled rejuvenation. In that case, power would gradually shift towards a more technocratic system, elements of which are already visible at the middle and lower levels of the Russian state.
As Putin has concentrated more control in his own hands, the effectiveness of key institutions has declined, while the risks associated with his eventual departure have increased. This becomes particularly important during unexpected crises, such as the Wagner mutiny in 2023 or the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region in 2024.
Putin’s system – highly resilient in the face of external pressure and familiar internal challenges – has entered a phase of reconfiguration involving generational change within the ruling elite and a redesign of the political system itself. If this reconfiguration succeeds, the system, with Putin still at its apex, may gain another 10 to 15 years of life. If it fails, it could begin to unravel even while Putin remains alive.
The next two or three years will be decisive.
Nikolai Petrov is a political expert with a background in Russian domestic politics, whose 40-year career has spanned the worlds of academic research, politics, and business, including serving as an adviser to the Russian parliament, government and presidential administration in 1990-1995. Before moving to NEST Centre, he was a visiting researcher at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, where he focused on Russian domestic politics, its impact on foreign policy, and the workings of Russia’s political regime. He is also a consulting fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, London. He leads NEST Centre’s work on Russian domestic politics, including the study of elites and decision-making processes.
anders_hansson on June 20th, 2026 at 11:53 UTC »
That was an interesting read.
TL;DR: Putin has started a rejuvenation process to make his political system more resilient to key elite people dying of old age. The process is risky, but once implemented it should secure that his policies live on a bit longer than if he didn't rejuvenate the system.
OrangeSpaceMan5 on June 20th, 2026 at 08:55 UTC »
Nothing sort of divine intervention is saving Putin (His legacy will be similar to that of Mussolini) and Russia , its a shame considering all of it was very easily avoidable
theipaper on June 20th, 2026 at 08:52 UTC »
When Western observers discuss threats to Vladimir Putin’s regime, they usually focus on two scenarios: an elite split and the disintegration of Russia.
Both are highly unlikely today. The elite remains consolidated around Putin, while Western sanctions have left its members with few alternatives. As for Russia’s many regions, the Kremlin combines tight control over local elites with well-tested mechanisms for responding rapidly to periodic crises. The regime itself remains resilient, adaptive and capable of reallocating resources when necessary.
The regime’s Achilles’ heel lies elsewhere. As a long-time watcher of the Russian elites and a former adviser to the Russian Parliament, government and presidency, I have studied how Putin has transformed, centralised and bolstered his rule, particularly since his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The true weakness of his regime lies in its dependence on manual control and its inability to reproduce itself. Putin’s system of governance and elite recruitment lacks an embedded mechanism of succession and renewal. It is essentially a one-off model. As long as Putin can personally allocate resources, balance competing interests and make key decisions, and as long as the layer immediately beneath him consists of associates he has known for 20-30 years and more, the system remains functional. The problem is that both Putin and most of his closest associates are now in their seventies. Some senior figures, including two consecutive chairpersons of the Supreme Court, have died in office.
The system Putin built has exhausted much of its potential. Unable to renew itself organically, it requires a fundamental overhaul.
The rise of Putin loyalistsTo avoid a sudden systemic breakdown caused by a shortage of fresh personnel, the Kremlin launched a large-scale reshuffle at the beginning of Putin’s new presidential term in 2024–25. These changes can be viewed as the beginning of a peculiar form of transition: the personalist leader remains in place but radically reshapes the team around him, and with it the broader political architecture.
The objective is to preserve power in Putin’s hands while altering the configuration of the political system. The Russian President is gradually relieved of routine management responsibilities while retaining ultimate control. Traditional elite clans are pushed away from real power. In their place come not individual successors but entire cohorts: members of the next generation, presidential aides, family members and the children of Putin’s longtime associates. The old guard weakens while new, carefully vetted and highly loyal groups gain influence.
Under this model, Putin does not leave the presidency when his current term expires. Indeed, the logic of the transition excludes the emergence of a genuine successor. Instead, a collective vice-presidency is being formed from younger members of the elite, all of whom remain dependent on Putin and responsive to his instructions. Putin himself would retain the role of supreme arbiter and strategist, including through the State Council, which brings together the heads of Russia’s key governing institutions.
The transition now under way amounts to putting the system on autopilot. Patriarch Putin would concern himself only with strategic decisions: the long-term development of the armed forces, Arctic expansion, major space programmes, large-scale infrastructure projects and relations with the West. Routine governance would increasingly be delegated to trusted younger lieutenants operating within previously approved programmes and strategies.
Putin’s project carries substantial risksThe shift towards this new model is proceeding in stages. The reorganisation of the executive branch in 2024 was followed by the restructuring of the Supreme Court and, more broadly, the judicial system in 2025. This year, the State Duma – and potentially the Federation Council (the upper chamber), given the large number of regional elections – will undergo renewal. State corporations, both economic and security-related, are likely to follow. By the 2030 election cycle, the entire governing system is expected not only to have been refreshed but also tested in practice.
The transition, however, carries substantial risks. Putin has initiated a complex and potentially dangerous process in the midst of a war because the alternative – preserving the existing configuration without renewal – poses an even greater threat to the system he has built. If successful, the transition could make the regime more resilient. During the process itself, however, vulnerability inevitably increases.
Weakening established elite groups and powerful institutional networks is bound to provoke resistance. To contain such resistance, the Kremlin has increasingly relied on political repression within the elite. By our estimates, annual repression rates among the highest federal-level elite now reach approximately 2–4 per cent. Excluding the Great Terror of 1937–38, this corresponds roughly to the average level of elite repression during the Joseph Stalin period.
These repressions function as a form of anaesthesia during a major political operation. Yet anaesthesia carries risks. Too much can paralyse the system; too little can allow events to escape control.