The Daily Populous Saturday March 14th, 2026 night edition
Authored by iranintl.com and submitted by Common_Touch_3741

As has been widely reported, Russia has provided limited direct assistance to the Islamic Republic against its attackers, despite Tehran’s extensive military support to Moscow since 2021.

This contrasts with how Tehran supplied large quantities of armed drones and ballistic missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Some see the ongoing war as yet another example of Putin doing little to help longstanding allies, as occurred with the downfall of long-time Syrian ally Bashar al-Assad, the American abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and Russia’s lack of help to Tehran last year during the 12-Day War.

Moscow, though, has provided some help to Iran in this war. Russia has long supplied Tehran with surveillance and repression technologies used to prevent domestic unrest. This support may have contributed to the Islamic Republic’s ability to survive the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and many other top leaders—at least so far.

Moscow has also reportedly provided Tehran with intelligence support for Iranian drone attacks against targets including US troops in Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbours, Israel, Turkey, Azerbaijan and elsewhere. T

hese attacks may have been undertaken in hopes of giving some of America’s Middle East partners an incentive to press Washington and Israel to halt strikes on Iran so Tehran would stop targeting them.

Putin may also see enabling Iranian drone attacks against US military targets in the region as payback for earlier US support to Ukraine for its drone strikes against Russian military targets both in occupied Ukraine and Russia itself. Putin’s desire for retribution on this score should not be underestimated.

Yet as gratifying as this may be to Putin, it has also created a problem for Russia that he may not have anticipated. Ukraine has offered to share its considerable experience in defending against drone attacks with countries now receiving them from Iran—an offer many have welcomed.

Perhaps this helps explain why Moscow has denied sharing intelligence with Tehran. But regardless of Russia’s role, the attacks themselves have given targeted states reason to value Ukraine and its survival more highly than before—something that is not in Russia’s interests.

This points to a larger tension: while Moscow and Tehran are both strongly anti-American, their interests are not fully aligned. While Tehran may view all countries cooperating with the United States or Israel as adversaries, Moscow has long sought pragmatic relations with many of them and tried to split some from Washington on key issues.

This approach paid off in the willingness of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and even Israel not to enforce Western sanctions against Russia. The longer Iranian attacks continue, however, the less willing these states may be to cooperate with Moscow if they believe it is complicit or unwilling to restrain Tehran.

At the same time, Moscow may appear less useful to Iran’s post-Ali Khamenei leadership if Putin cannot pressure or persuade Donald Trump to end his war against Iran.

Putin also seeks to preserve as much of Trump’s sympathy as possible regarding Ukraine. He would not want to provoke renewed large-scale US military support for Kyiv by appearing to obstruct Washington’s campaign against Tehran.

To some extent, the US-Israeli war on Iran has benefited Putin by diverting Western attention from Ukraine. Hostile Iranian actions that reduce Persian Gulf energy flows and push global oil and gas prices higher also benefit petroleum-exporting Russia.

Moscow has also gained from Trump’s reduced pressure on India over purchases of Russian oil, helping stabilize global supply and prevent prices from rising even further.

The longer the war continues, however, the more it risks imposing greater costs than benefits for Moscow. Prolonged conflict could deepen Middle Eastern reliance on Ukraine against Iranian drone attacks, strain Russia’s relations with regional states wary of Tehran, and further weaken the Islamic Republic, making it less useful to Russia.

For Putin, the war’s advantages are real—but they are likely to diminish the longer it lasts.

BPMMPB on March 13rd, 2026 at 19:18 UTC »

What the fuck are we doing

thesquidsquidly22 on March 13rd, 2026 at 19:16 UTC »

So patrolling the straight of hormuz waiting to get hit by a drone. Sounds about as fun as patrolling Afghanistan waiting to get hit by an IED.

Common_Touch_3741 on March 13rd, 2026 at 19:03 UTC »

> A Marine expeditionary unit carrying about 2,200 Marines aboard three US Navy amphibious ships has been ordered to deploy to the Middle East, two US officials told ABC News, as the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed due to Iranian missile and drone attacks.

> The Japan-based amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli and the Marines assigned to it are now heading toward the Middle East as part of the reinforcement, The Wall Street Journal reported citing US officials.

> Marine expeditionary units are designed for rapid-response missions and typically operate from amphibious assault ships capable of supporting a wide range of military operations, from crisis response to combat deployments.

> War Secretary Pete Hegseth has approved a request from US Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees American military operations in the region, to deploy elements of the amphibious ready group along with an attached Marine expeditionary unit, the WSJ report said.