The most direct military clash between the IDF and the Soviet Union unfolded gradually and largely out of public view, emerging during the final year of the War of Attrition as a dangerous escalation that brought a Cold War superpower into open combat with Israeli forces. What began as an Egyptian effort to recover from defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War evolved into a covert superpower deployment, direct aerial combat between IDF and Soviet pilots, and deadly missile engagements that reshaped the regional balance and hastened the war’s end.
After the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt sought to challenge control of Sinai not through a decisive ground offensive but through prolonged pressure. Artillery duels along the Suez Canal intensified. Commando raids became routine. Air power assumed a central role. IDF aircraft struck Egyptian positions along the canal and increasingly deep inside Egypt, targeting air bases, radar installations, bridges, power stations and logistical hubs.
By 1969, the imbalance in the air was stark. Mirage III fighters and newly introduced F-4 Phantom jets gave the IDF the ability to operate hundreds of kilometers west of the canal. A series of deep-penetration raids, later known collectively as Operation Priha, exposed Egypt’s inability to defend its own heartland. Bombs fell near Cairo, Alexandria and the Aswan Dam. Egyptian fighter losses mounted, while air defenses struggled to intercept or survive.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser concluded that Egypt could not sustain the war alone. In the autumn of 1969 and again during a visit to Moscow on Jan. 24–25, 1970, he pressed Soviet leaders for expanded assistance. This time, the request went beyond weapons. Nasser asked the Soviet Union to defend Egyptian airspace directly.
The Soviet response was unprecedented. Moscow approved a covert deployment code-named Operation Caucasus, involving a full expeditionary force, divisional in size. At its core was the 18th Special Anti-Aircraft Rocket Division of the Soviet Air Defence Forces , reinforced by fighter aviation regiments equipped with MiG-21MF aircraft, radar units, electronic warfare teams and thousands of personnel.
Beginning in March 1970, Soviet ships unloaded men and equipment at Egyptian ports. SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile batteries were deployed around Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan. Soviet pilots flew combat air patrols. Radar operators, missile crews, technicians and controllers took over entire sectors of the air defense network. Vehicles were painted in Egyptian colors. Soviet personnel wore desert uniforms resembling Egyptian dress. Officially, both Cairo and Moscow denied the deployment.
IDF intelligence detected the presence almost immediately. Unit 848 intercepted Russian-language communications. Radar signatures and operational behavior matched Soviet doctrine. The conclusion was unavoidable: Soviet forces were now actively engaged.
5 View gallery Suez Canal in 1970 ( Photo: Meir Tzvi )
Despite this, political leaders sought to avoid escalation. The IDF was directed to avoid contact with Soviet-manned systems. Deep-penetration missions were curtailed and by April 1970 halted entirely, ending a year of successful strikes deep inside Egypt.
The restraint backfired. Soviet commanders used the pause to reshape the battlefield. Missile batteries advanced eastward toward the canal in carefully protected stages. Egyptian air defense units were freed to reinforce the front. The operating space for IDF aircraft narrowed steadily.
By early summer, the consequences were severe. Several Phantoms were shot down by surface-to-air missiles. Aircrew were killed, wounded or captured. Soviet confidence increased. MiG-21 patrols expanded their range, probing closer to the canal and beyond.
On July 25, Soviet-flown MiGs intercepted IDF A-4 Skyhawks during a ground-attack mission and pursued them into Sinai. An AA-2 Atoll missile struck one aircraft, forcing an emergency landing at Rephidim. For the first time, Soviet pilots had fired air-to-air missiles east of the canal.
Maj. Gen. Mordechai Hod, commander of the IDF Air Arm, and Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev, chief of staff, concluded that restraint had failed. Air superiority, regarded as a strategic pillar since 1967, was under direct threat. Hod proposed a controlled confrontation in air-to-air combat, where IDF experience and training were believed to offer an advantage over Soviet pilots, rather than continued exposure to missile ambushes.
The plan was presented to the cabinet on July 25 and approved by Prime Minister Golda Meir. The objective was deterrence, not escalation. The operation was code-named Rimon 20.
Planning relied on deception, timing and intelligence dominance. Unit 848 and other intelligence elements provided continuous monitoring of Egyptian and Soviet communications. IDF electronic warfare units prepared to disrupt radar coverage at key moments.
On the morning of July 30, routine-looking strike missions were flown along the canal to preserve normal patterns. Shortly after 14:00, four F-4 Phantoms from Squadron 69, led by Avihu Bin-Nun with navigator Shaul Levi, attacked an Egyptian radar station near Sokhna, flying profiles typical of Skyhawks to avoid drawing special attention.
At the same time, four Mirage IIIC fighters from Squadron 119 — flown by Amos Amir, Asher Snir, Avraham Salmon and Avi Gilad — crossed into Egyptian airspace near Hurghada. Flying in tight formation, they appeared on radar as a single reconnaissance aircraft and climbed to altitude on a steady northward track.
Soviet controllers responded as expected. The first quartet of MiG-21s lifted off from Kawm Ushim under Capt. Yevgeny Kamenev. Two additional formations followed from Beni Suef, led by Capt. Nikolai Yurchenko and Capt. Vitaliy Saranin. Further MiGs joined from al-Qatamiyah. In total, 24 Soviet fighters were committed.
Unseen, additional Mirages from Squadrons 117 and 101 loitered at low altitude over Sinai, beyond radar coverage, while another quartet waited on alert at Rephidim.
5 View gallery Rephidim ( Photo: David Rubinger )
As the MiGs closed to within 20 kilometers, Hod gave the order to attack. Fuel tanks were jettisoned. Formations broke apart. The engagement collapsed into a chaotic, close-range dogfight as Phantoms and Mirages converged from multiple directions.
Salmon scored the first kill, firing an AIM-9D Sidewinder at a MiG threatening a pair of Phantoms. The missile struck, killing Yurchenko. Moments later, Snir downed another MiG flown by Capt. Yevgeny Yakovlev, who ejected but later died. Snir was then hit by a missile fired by Capt. Vladimir Ivlev. His Mirage was badly damaged, its tail shredded, but he disengaged and landed safely at Rephidim.
Phantom pilot Aviem Sella, flying with navigator Reuven Reshef, engaged a MiG flown by Capt. Georgy Syrkin. After an initial missile appeared ineffective, a second hit destroyed the aircraft. Syrkin ejected and survived.
Another MiG, flown by Kamenev, attempted to escape at low altitude. Bin-Nun and Levi launched an AIM-7 Sparrow at extremely low height, destroying the aircraft.
The final loss was confirmed only years later. A MiG flown by Capt. Vladimir Zhuravlev, pursued by Salmon and Iftach Spector, managed to flee the immediate fight but later crashed. Salmon and Spector were credited with a shared kill.
The entire engagement lasted less than three minutes. Five Soviet MiGs were destroyed. Three pilots were killed. Two ejected. No IDF aircraft were lost.
Publicly, details were muted. Initial statements spoke only of enemy aircraft downed. Egypt denied losses. Moscow remained silent. Within days, foreign reports identified the pilots as Soviet. In October, Meir confirmed it openly.
Moscow responded quickly. Marshal Pavel Kutakhov, commander of the Soviet Air Force, flew to Egypt. Reinforcements followed. Additional MiG units arrived, along with Su-15 interceptors. Plans were drawn up for retaliation through surface-to-air missile ambushes rather than air combat.
5 View gallery F-4 Phantom ( Photo: IDF )
That response came on Aug. 3.
IDF strike aircraft were dispatched to attack missile batteries deployed between Abu Suweir and Ismailia in an operation later known as Shayar 265. The mission aimed to blunt the expanding Soviet-built air defense network. Instead, the aircraft flew into a carefully prepared trap. Decoy missile sites had been erected. Operational SA-3 batteries were concealed and linked to coordinated fire plans.
A dense barrage of missiles followed. One Phantom was hit and went down. Pilot Yigal Shohat was severely wounded and later lost a leg. Navigator Moshe Goldwasser was captured by Egyptian forces, tortured and later died in captivity.
Another Phantom was badly damaged. Pilot Raanan Naaman was wounded by missile fragments that tore through the cockpit. Navigator Yoram Romem took control of the aircraft and flew it back to Rephidim despite extensive damage. Both men were later decorated by the IDF.
Shayar 265 underscored a grim conclusion for IDF planners: there was no tactical solution to the Soviet missile network then deployed in Egypt. Losses mounted. Strategic calculations shifted.
Within days, U.S.-brokered diplomacy produced a ceasefire. It took effect on Aug. 7, 1970, ending the War of Attrition. Although Egypt later violated the agreement by advancing missile batteries eastward, large-scale fighting ceased.
Soviet forces remained in Egypt after the ceasefire, continuing to operate air defenses. Only in 1972 did President Anwar Sadat expel most Soviet troops, retaining advisers.
sciguy52 on February 16th, 2026 at 03:42 UTC »
Wasn't it also true that in reality during the Korean war the U.S. were fighting Soviets in the air? It is my understanding that was the case, or maybe that was Vietnam? Also kept quiet.
Along these lines there have been several U.S. and Soviet sub collisions, most all I believe were kept quiet at the time. And a Soviet sub collided with a U.S. aircraft carrier as well.
When two powers are not prepared, or do not wish to go to war the cooperation in keeping it all secret seems to be pretty high. "You don't tell anybody and we won't tell anybody"
I imagine it was the same with the Israeli's and the Soviets but in this case is was not accidents but actual combat. But still, when two sides don't want to go to war they can be willing to cover up a lot to keep it from happening.
Psychological-Flow55 on February 15th, 2026 at 22:49 UTC »
I believe this was during the war of Attrition. I see why Egypt became exhausted, because during just about all of the wars between 1947 to 1974 it contributed the most man power, the troops, weapons, sacrifices towards the Arab struggle with Israel, while other arab states gave smaller token number of troops, just donated some weapons, or stationed troops in Sinai or The Golan without actually getting involved in the battle.
The Soviets btw once Yom Kippur war happened, actually became frustrated with the Arab bloc, the soviets feeling was that they had to bail the Arab bloc out time and time again, and then the Soviet Union being brought to the brink of nuclear war more than once with the USA (ie - the 1956 suez canal crisis, and more so during the 1973-1974 Yom kippur war), all this made the soviets exhausted, supposedly breznhev was pissed that Sadat woke him up asking for help to fight the Israelis (after Egypt kicked out like 20,000 soviet troops and advisors prio, just to get in America good graces)
I wonder what America learned and studied from these clashes in the war of attrition between the Soviets and Israelis, the soviet exposed themselves in these battles with Israel.
DroneMaster2000 on February 15th, 2026 at 20:00 UTC »
One of the most fascinating and once secret chapters of modern military history took place in the summer of 1970, when Israeli Air Force pilots directly fought Soviet pilots in open combat at the height of the Cold War. For years, much of this confrontation was kept quiet. Only later did documents and official accounts reveal that Israeli and Soviet forces had met each other in real air battles over Egypt.
The story began after the Six-Day War in 1967. Egypt had suffered a major defeat and lost the Sinai Peninsula. Instead of launching an immediate large scale invasion to retake it, Egypt began a prolonged campaign along the Suez Canal known as the War of Attrition. The goal was to pressure Israel through constant artillery fire, raids and air attacks.
By 1969, Israel had established strong air superiority. Mirage and Phantom jets struck Egyptian positions along the canal and deep inside the country, targeting air bases, radar systems and infrastructure near Cairo and elsewhere. Egyptian defenses struggled to respond effectively. President Gamal Abdel Nasser turned to Moscow and requested direct Soviet help in defending Egyptian airspace.
The Soviet Union agreed. In early 1970, thousands of Soviet personnel arrived secretly in Egypt in what later became known as Operation Caucasus. They deployed MiG 21 fighter squadrons, advanced surface to air missile systems and full air defense units. Equipment was disguised and officially their presence was denied. However, Israeli intelligence intercepted Russian language communications and identified Soviet tactics and command structures. It became clear that Israeli pilots were facing Soviet crews.
At first, Israel tried to avoid direct clashes. Deep strikes into Egypt were reduced. But during this pause, Soviet operated missile batteries advanced toward the Suez Canal. Israeli aircraft began to suffer losses from surface to air missiles. The balance in the air was changing.
On July 25, 1970, Soviet flown MiG 21s fired air to air missiles at Israeli aircraft east of the canal. This was a direct engagement. Israeli leaders decided to respond in a controlled way. The Air Force prepared an ambush designed to draw Soviet fighters into a dogfight, where Israeli pilots believed they had an advantage. Prime Minister Golda Meir approved the plan. The operation was called Rimon 20.
On July 30, Israeli aircraft staged what appeared to be routine missions. Soviet controllers scrambled MiG 21s to intercept. In total, twenty four Soviet fighters entered the engagement. Within minutes, the encounter turned into close range aerial combat.
Five Soviet MiGs were shot down. Three Soviet pilots were killed and two ejected. No Israeli aircraft were lost. It was one of the rare confirmed instances during the Cold War when Israeli and Soviet pilots directly fought each other in open combat.
Publicly, details were limited at first. Egypt denied losses and Moscow remained silent. Only later was it openly acknowledged that the downed pilots were Soviet officers.
The Soviet response followed a different path. Instead of seeking another dogfight, they relied on their expanding missile network. On August 3, Israeli jets attacking missile sites flew into a coordinated surface to air ambush. One Israeli Phantom was shot down. Navigator Moshe Goldwasser was captured and later died in captivity. Pilot Yigal Shohat was severely wounded and later lost a leg. Another damaged Phantom barely made it back to base.
These events demonstrated both Israeli effectiveness in air to air combat and the growing danger posed by the Soviet built air defense system in Egypt.
On August 7, 1970, a ceasefire ended the War of Attrition. Soviet forces remained in Egypt until 1972, when President Anwar Sadat expelled most of them.
For years, this episode received little attention. Later disclosures revealed a striking fact. In the middle of the Cold War, Israeli and Soviet pilots fought each other directly over Egypt, in a short but intense confrontation that remains a unique chapter in the military history of both countries.