The Daily Populous Friday December 12nd, 2025 evening edition
Authored by opforjournal.com and submitted by Due_Search_8040

On December 4, the US released a new National Security Strategy. The new strategy, which pivots away from long-held tenets of US foreign policy has caused significant domestic and international controversy. The most contentious elements include a shift from values-based alliances to transactional diplomacy, an antagonistic stance toward the European Union coupled with accommodation of Russia, and a restoration of the Monroe Doctrine.

While much attention has focused on domestic and allied reactions, this Situation Report examines how the new strategy is being interpreted by America’s adversaries by providing a sampling of reactions from political commentators in China, Russia, and Iran. Though not a comprehensive survey, this sample highlights how authoritative voices in these countries are framing the strategy for domestic audiences. This Situation Report is limited to documenting international reactions and does not evaluate the merits of the new National Security Strategy itself.

This Situation Report is broken into three parts:

Interpretations of what the strategy means for the future of US global leadership On the US’s Role in International Security On the Future of US Alliances On the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine Interpretations of US strategy toward global adversary nations On US-Russia Relations On US-China Relations On US-Iran Relations Interpretations of what the strategy says about US domestic politics

1. INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THE STRATEGY MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF US GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Russian and Chinese commentators are skeptical that the US is returning to an isolationist foreign policy or has abandoned plans for global hegemony. One notable quote from a Chinese commentator has dubbed the shift in policy: “not a change in the direction of hegemony, but a change in the method of hegemony.”

Russian and Chinese commentators believe the document represents a fundamental shift in US relations with Europe and other liberal democracies. There is a majority view that the US’s criticism of its European allies stems from incompatible world views held by National Conservatives in the US and the Liberal Internationalist leaders of the European Union. Commentators are divided on whether this portends a permanent rupture in the transatlantic alliance.

There is a consensus view among all commentators that the US will become more aggressive in asserting its dominance in Latin America to prop up friendly governments, marginalize unfriendly ones, curb migration, corner resources, and expel Russian and Chinese economic influence from the region.

Notable Analysis from Chinese, Russian, Iranian Commentators:

1.a. On the US’s Role in International Security

From The Paper (a leading Chinese digital news site by state-owned Shanghai United Media Group)

“Hong Kong media analysis suggests that although the United States has a long tradition of returning to isolationism, this does not mean that the United States will ‘close its doors and ignore world affairs.’ In order to return to isolationism, the United States will instead use the concept of offshore balancing to destabilize the world, thereby avoiding threats to its own hegemony. “Zhu Feng believes that the United States has no intention of strategic contraction or abandoning its hegemony. ‘The latest security strategy report only adjusts the focus and priorities of the United States’ diplomatic and security intervention, but there is no substantial change in the United States’ global alliance support system, and the United States’ overseas troop deployments and massive overseas military presence have not decreased.’ “‘This is not a strategic retrenchment, nor does it mean that the United States is shifting its strategic focus back to the Western Hemisphere,’ he said. “Diao Daming stated that the strategic shift proposed in this report is not a ‘change in the direction of hegemony, but a change in the method of hegemony.’ He analyzed that the United States has not abandoned great power competition, but only that ‘the method, the scope, and the desired effect of competition have changed.’ In his view, the great power competition in Trump’s foreign policy philosophy is not a life-or-death confrontation in the sense of ideology and values, but rather a confrontation of strength between great powers. ‘It wants to maximize its interests and achieve the highest level in everything related to its interests. I am the strongest country, economically, militarily, and technologically.’ “‘This kind of hegemony is not a hegemony in terms of values ​​or ideology, but a hegemony of real interests and hard power,’ Diao Daming pointed out. ‘This is obviously not about not wanting to maintain hegemony, but simply about the different understandings of hegemony leading to such a difference in the way hegemony is achieved.’”

From Mei Yang, Assistant Director at the Qianhai Institute of International Affairs

“Trump’s global order’s sphere of influence is structured like concentric circles, presenting a ‘core-periphery’ global power hierarchy. This structure clearly demonstrates the priorities the United States places on foreign affairs, with higher priorities for those in the core circle. For example, on the issue of illegal immigration, the US will inevitably choose to protect the American mainland, treating Central and South American countries as outsiders. However, when external influences intervene in Central and South America, the US will uphold its sense of ownership within the Greater Americas sphere of influence to resist the intervention and influence of extra-regional countries, expelling their influence and power. “In terms of the concentric circle structure, (1) the core level: the United States mainland; (2) the secondary core area: the Greater America region; (3) the alliance network level: the transatlantic network of the United States and Europe + Japan, South Korea, Australia and part of the Indo-Pacific region + the Middle East; (4) the competitor level: Russia Eurasia + China East Asia sphere of influence; (5) the hostile country level: Iran, North Korea. “Trump’s worldview has roughly formed four major spheres of influence. “Based on the concentric circle structure, in Trump’s view of the world order, the world today has basically formed a division into: the core sphere of influence of the United States (the United States mainland + the Americas), the pan-American sphere of influence (including Europe, Japan, South Korea and parts of the Indo-Pacific region and the Middle East), the Russian Eurasian sphere of influence, and the Chinese East Asian sphere of influence. “Therefore, in the current global strategic landscape of the United States, its foreign affairs mainly address two major issues: first, how to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict and prevent Russia’s expansion of its influence into Europe, that is, to avoid the erosion of Russia’s Eurasian sphere of influence into the pan-American sphere of influence; and second, how to handle relations with China, acknowledging China’s national strength and its sphere of influence in East Asia. Therefore, the United States is unlikely to interfere excessively in East Asian affairs such as the Taiwan issue and Sino-Japanese relations, and instead acknowledges China’s dominance in this region of influence.” […] “Many opinions, based solely on the text of the ‘Strategy,’ conclude that the United States has abandoned global hegemony, which we believe is untenable. As mentioned earlier, with the continued presence of global military power, the US-led alliance system, and US control over the Indo-Pacific, the fundamental framework of US global hegemony remains unchanged. Whether a national strategy is contraction or expansion is subject to fluctuations, much like the economic cycle; expansion occurs when the market is favorable, and contraction when it is unfavorable. The current strategic contraction by the US, consolidating its strength for intrinsic improvement, has essentially laid the foundation for the next expansion. We should remain clear-headed and not hastily conclude that a major irreversible change has occurred in US national strategy. Furthermore, this ‘Strategy’ is only a strategy for Trump’s term, not a national strategy for subsequent presidents; the US can still return to a hegemonic expansionist model at any time. “Correspondingly, the US has shifted its approach to hegemony, abandoning the costly arms race and military deterrence in favor of ‘low-cost hegemony.’ First, regarding the burden of global governance, it has abandoned the lengthy processes and bureaucratic waste of international organizations and multilateral mechanisms, opting instead for bilateral negotiations. Second, it emphasizes cost-sharing within the alliance system, rather than the US footing the bill. Third, in terms of intervention in global conflicts, it favors mediation, conciliation, and weapons silence, preferring direct military intervention. These changes only demonstrate that the mode of hegemony’s operation has changed, but hegemony itself remains hegemony.”

From Xinhua (Official Chinese State News Agency)

“On the military front, the report proposes preventing regional conflicts from escalating into continental and global wars, maintaining the world’s strongest nuclear deterrent, building next-generation missile defense systems such as the Golden Dome for the U.S. mainland, revitalizing the defense industrial base, and addressing the cost mismatch between low-cost drones and expensive weapon systems such as missiles. The report emphasizes that the U.S. must end the ‘free-riding’ mentality among allies and partners, requiring them to assume primary defense responsibilities in their regions and contribute more to collective defense.”

From Rybar (leading Russian military blogger)

“And it’s not surprising that the rejection of global leadership is refuted literally by the second half of the same document. “As soon as the review of regional priorities begins, the authors of the national security strategy seem to immediately forget that they wrote in the first part about protectionism and ‘America first’. “Now, the US authorities will focus on asserting American control in the Western Hemisphere, suppressing China in the Indo-Pacific region, strengthening European security, preventing ‘hostile domination’ in the Middle East, and establishing global leadership in technological standards.”

From Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief of Russia in Global Affairs

“The United States is moving toward a position of ruthless and unfettered egoism. If they see any interest, they will pursue it by any means necessary, including unceremonious means. And we need to be prepared for this. It’s just that these interests are fewer in Russia than in China , European countries, or Brazil.”

From TopWar.ru (leading Russian military affairs publication)

“The main principles of the new administration’s strategy are: ‘Peace through Strength’ (since ‘strength can help achieve peace, for parties that respect our strength often turn to us for help and are sympathetic to our efforts to resolve conflicts’), ‘Flexible Realism’ (‘we seek good and peaceful relations with all peoples of the world without imposing any democratic or social changes on them’), and ‘Nations First’ (‘it is natural and right for all nations to put their own interests first and protect their sovereignty’). “In other words, the White House is abandoning the strategy of replacing undesirable regimes through ‘democratic revolutions.’ It will now adopt ‘flexible realism’ in its dealings with authoritarian regimes—in other words, developing relations without imposing democratic values ​​and liberalization. “Furthermore, the Strategy states that ‘the days when the United States, like Atlas, upheld the entire world order are over.’ Instead of global hegemony, it proposes a balance of power: US allies and partners must assume responsibility for their regions and make a much greater contribution to collective defense. “This point has been interpreted by many as the US abandoning its role as global policeman. To some extent, this is certainly true—the new administration is clearly anti-globalist, but it clearly has no intention of relinquishing its dominant role in the world. It’s worth noting the ‘Balance of Power’ section, which explicitly states this.”

From Tasnim News (media outlet associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)

“American hegemony, built on military, economic, and ideological leadership after World War II, is now showing signs of structural weakness. This decline is not only due to domestic American limitations, but is part of a long-term trend, clearly expressed in the National Security Strategy, that is weakening NATO while leaving Europe in limbo” […] “The decline of hegemony is evident here as the United States can no longer appear in the role of a ‘moral leader’ and instead seeks to turn to domestic protectionist policies, indicating a loss of soft influence against rivals such as China. “Ultimately, the new policy appears to be part of a larger pattern of decline, as the United States, focusing on the Monroe Doctrine rather than strengthening NATO, is transforming from a ‘global hegemon’ to a ‘regional power.’”

From Nour News (news outlet associated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council)

“The U.S. National Security Strategy shows that, despite stepping back from the idea of being the world’s policeman, Washington still seeks to maintain dominance—this time by shifting costs onto others. The ‘fear and doubt’ policy under Trump, encouraging allies to purchase arms, fostering an arms race, and destabilizing multilateral institutions, reflects an effort to retain influence. The U.S. acknowledges it cannot lead the world alone but seeks to make the emerging order uncontrollable through disruption and chaos. It is therefore the historic responsibility of independent countries to strengthen political, security, and economic cohesion to prevent the world from returning to a cycle of proxy wars and unipolar domination. The future will either be a field of American chaos or a platform for a multipolar order—the choice rests with the global independence bloc.”

1.b. On the Future of US Alliances

From Chinese Military Network (publication of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army)

“Regarding Europe’s problems, the United States does not intend to revive the ‘splendid isolation’ policy of World War I, retreating to the Western Hemisphere and ‘living in seclusion.’ Instead, the report openly states its intention to cultivate resistance forces in Europe and support so-called ‘patriotic European parties.’ This is tantamount to fostering far-right forces in Europe and blatantly interfering in the internal affairs of European countries. Polish Prime Minister Tusk couldn’t help but appeal to the White House on social media: ‘Europe is your closest ally, not your problem.’ But the United States completely ignores this. The report clearly states that it aims to help Europe restore national sovereignty, support European identity and nationalism, but in reality, it still demands that Europe obediently follow the United States’ lead. “On the issue of money, the US is even more ruthless. The report demands that NATO member states increase their defense spending from 2% of GDP to 5%, essentially forcing European countries to tighten their belts and pay more protection money to the US. Meanwhile, the report only briefly mentions Russia, stating only that it wants to rebuild strategic stability with Russia, and accusing Europe of ‘obstructing US efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict.’ The US is making European countries spend more money to defend against Russia while simultaneously talking about strategic stability with Russia itself. One unnamed European diplomat bitterly remarked,‘ This is even worse than Vance’s speech in Munich in February.’ Kremlin spokesman Peskov publicly stated that the US strategy is ‘basically consistent with our vision.’ Ironically, Russia seems more pleased with the US national security strategy. What do the European countries, nominally allies but actually being trampled underfoot by the US, think about this? “Throughout the report, the Trump administration unabashedly pushed ‘America First’ to its extreme. The report bluntly states: ‘The era in which the United States, like Atlas (the towering giant in Greek mythology), single-handedly maintained the world order is over.’ Regarding Indo-Pacific allies, the US demands that Japan, South Korea, and Australia open more ports and facilities, increase defense spending, and invest in deterrence capabilities, essentially forcing allies to bear the risks within the first island chain. In the Middle East, the report explicitly states the need to avoid ‘perpetual war,’ focusing solely on energy interests and maritime routes. The so-called ‘responsibility sharing’ is merely a way to shift the costs of confrontation onto allies, while the US reaps the benefits.”

“It is noteworthy that the report includes significantly more content about ‘Taiwan.’ Reuters reports that the latest strategy uses stronger language regarding Taiwan than during Trump’s first term. Statistics show that the report mentions Taiwan much more frequently than in 2017. “The report states: ‘There is considerable external attention on Taiwan, partly because of its dominant position in global semiconductor production, but more importantly because Taiwan has direct access to the second island chain and separates Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters of war. Approximately one-third of global maritime traffic passes through the South China Sea annually, which has a significant impact on the U.S. economy. Therefore, it is best to prevent conflict by maintaining military superiority. The United States will also maintain its long-standing policy of not supporting any unilateral changes to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.’” […] “Both experts stated that the latest National Security Strategy report mentions the Taiwan issue more frequently than previous reports, a move by Trump to balance the interests of hawkish forces within the United States. Diao Daming believes that while Trump himself may not be particularly interested in the Taiwan issue, this doesn’t prevent him from using Taiwan and other related issues as a ‘lever’ in future negotiations and competition with China. ‘Moreover, if you don’t even have the concept of strategic competition with China, and you also have no say on geopolitics and the Taiwan issue, it’s difficult for American hawks or the mainstream strategic community to accept. This, to some extent, balances or compensates for Trump’s shift in China policy from a strategic to an economic level.’ “Zhu Feng believes that, judging from the report’s statements, the Trump administration actually wants to ‘further reduce the challenges that the Taiwan issue poses to the US diplomatic and security strategy, and does not want the Taiwan issue to hinder the current process of new changes in US domestic and foreign policy.’ He said that Trump wants to ‘reduce the role of the Taiwan issue in US diplomacy and further avoid the risk of further tensions or even a full-scale escalation of conflict between China and the US over the Taiwan issue.’”

“From October 29 to November 4, 2025, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth launched the most systematic ‘Indo-Pacific offensive’ since the Trump administration took office—visiting Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea to conduct defense cooperation negotiations. This trip partially overlapped with President Trump’s Asia-Pacific visit, forming a strategic division of labor and complementarity. Hegseth’s core task was to transform the Trump administration’s preference for bilateral transactions and rejection of multilateral mechanisms into a series of concrete defense ‘transactional cooperation’ in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby constructing a new type of ‘transactional’ military alliance network for China’s surrounding security. From this perspective, the United States is still implementing a networked alliance-style defense deployment in the Indo-Pacific region, demonstrating that the United States has not left the Indo-Pacific. “My country’s surrounding security issues, whether in the South China Sea, relations with Japan, or subsequent relations with Vietnam, India, and Southeast Asian countries, are all subject to strategic constraints from the United States. The Taiwan issue, too, is unlikely to see a ‘unilateral change of status quo’ given the escalating US-Taiwan military cooperation. It is conceivable that the United States has not left the Indo-Pacific, but rather exists in a different form; China’s strategic security risks remain a cause for concern.”

“However, the Strategy’s primary target of criticism was Europe (which is unsurprising, given that it is currently the bastion of the globalist project, an alternative to the American right-wing conservative one). The text stated that the United States would ‘confront anti-democratic restrictions on fundamental freedoms imposed by elites in Europe, English-speaking countries, and the rest of the democratic world, particularly among our allies.’ “The Strategy notes that Europe’s share of global GDP has declined from 25% in 1990 to 14% today, but this problem pales in comparison to the real and more serious threat of the disappearance of civilization. “More serious challenges facing Europe include the activities of the European Union and other transnational organizations that undermine political freedom and sovereignty; migration policies that are reshaping the continent and leading to conflict; censorship of free speech and the suppression of political opposition; declining birth rates; and the loss of national identity. “It’s undeniable that the Americans’ criticism of Europe is quite fair and accurate. One also has to agree with the US administration’s prediction: if current trends continue, Europe will cease to be itself in 20 years or even sooner.”

"The Strategy mentions other parts of the world, but relations with Europe are significant. American statehood itself, formed in the 17th and 18th centuries, was built as an antithesis to the tyrannical and corrupt Old World, from which settlers fled in search of freedom—religious, political, and entrepreneurial. And although only a historical myth remains of that ‘farmer’s republic,’ it remains fundamental. And from the perspective of this myth, what the republic has become since the 20th century is almost a betrayal of all ideals. The most staunch wing of conservatives who supported Trump advocates a return to these ideals. However, the 47th president himself, by ‘making America great again,’ naturally means a softer version—something like the ‘golden fifties.’ “One thing is certain. Trump and his supporters are not averse to ‘cancelling’ the political 20th century: the period when the United States, beginning with its decision to enter World War I, embarked on a path of liberal internationalism. Specifically, they are referring to the shift made by then-President Woodrow Wilson, the founder of the very liberal world order that prevailed at the end of the last century. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth formulated the rejection of this legacy in a speech at the Ronald Reagan Forum: out with idealistic utopianism, in with firm and sober realism. He explained that Washington sees the world as a collection of spheres of influence of the most powerful countries (presumably with corresponding rights), two of which are the United States and China. The rest are less clear; perhaps an explanation will follow in the military strategy being prepared by the Pentagon. “The fluctuations of American policy are historically linked to Europe. The isolated ‘City on a Hill’ was erected as a rejection of the Old World. The liberal order, by contrast, symbolized the recognition of an unbreakable Atlantic bond. After the First World War, this idea failed to materialize properly, but after the Second, it more than proved successful. “The new Strategy intertwines two approaches. On the one hand, it calls on Europe to address its own numerous problems rather than rely on America as a parasite. On the other hand, the call to ‘encourage resistance’ among European peoples to the EU’s pernicious policies does not indicate indifference. Rather, the United States aims for ‘regime change’ in Europe, from a liberal-globalist to a national-conservative one. And through this, to strengthen its own influence. A ‘recovered’ Europe is intended to become an important support for Washington’s policy, whose priorities are unconditional dominance in the Western Hemisphere (it is no coincidence that the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ is explicitly mentioned ) and a profitable commercial arrangement with China.”

From Roman Romanov, a columnist focused on US politics at Russian business journal Vedomosti

“Secondly, by condemning the EU and decrying NATO expansion, Donald Trump has no plans to either withdraw from the alliance or weaken it. His goal is to strengthen the defense capabilities of his European allies. This is being done not only to secure new contracts for American arms manufacturers, but also to further limit the prospects for normalizing relations between Brussels and Moscow. Ultimately, the US is tying the EU more tightly to itself, minimizing its own risks of a direct escalation of relations with Moscow.”

“Washington’s repeated affronts have triggered an identity shock within Europe. Officials such as Kaja Kallas and Alice Rufo have openly warned that the U.S. National Security Strategy is ‘ruthless’ and grounded in a domination-oriented worldview. Josep Borrell has described it as a ‘declaration of political war against Europe.’ Such admissions show that the transatlantic divide has reached a structural level. “Europe is confronting a truth it has long avoided: the United States is not a partner—it is an overshadowing hegemon. “If this trajectory continues, migration pressures, demographic stagnation, security anxiety, and energy dependence will transform Europe into a semi-passive bloc; a continent whose deeper integration into Washington’s architecture only accelerates the erosion of its autonomy and strategic identity.”

“Second, the criticism of Europe’s ‘civilizational decline’ in Trump’s national security document is part of the ‘America First’ ideology that undermines the role of shared values ​​in maintaining hegemony. American hegemony has always been based on soft power, i.e. the promotion of Western values ​​and ideological unity. “But the 2025 document, by blaming Europe for migration and ‘cultural erosion,’ has turned strategic alliances into an ideological issue and implicitly supports European far-right parties. Moreover, this approach seeks to weaken the role of NATO, which has played an important role in US global hegemony.”

1.c. On the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine

From Lan Xinzhen, political commentator at The Beijing Review

“The report explicitly prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, aiming to prevent ‘hostile foreign powers’ from controlling key assets there; 'ensure the United States continues to have access to key strategic locations’; strengthen military deployments in Latin America; establish or expand corridors in strategically important locations; and link aid and trade to relations with Latin American countries. The US government is pushing the 200-year-old Monroe Doctrine to a more radical and modern version, opening a ‘new arena’ in Latin America.”

“Now, the Trump administration explicitly states in its National Security Strategy that the United States will no longer pursue global hegemony, but will instead shift its focus back to its own ‘backyard’—Latin America. “This seemingly sober and pragmatic shift is actually driven by ulterior motives. A careful reading of the report reveals that the US’s so-called ‘abandonment of global hegemony’ is merely a change in how it shifts its power from a globally dispersed distribution to a concentration in key regions. The most striking aspect of the report is its ‘unprecedented emphasis’ on the Western Hemisphere. The White House team has directly invoked the banner of ‘Monroe Doctrine 2.0,’ giving it a more politically correct name: ‘Trump Inference,’ the core of which is simply to declare that ‘Latin America must be America’s Latin America.’ Moreover, the report detailed a comprehensive ‘backyard control plan’: deploying the USS Ford carrier strike group around the Panama Canal to ensure absolute US control over this strategic choke point; deploying 8,000 additional troops to the US-Mexico border to establish a so-called ‘triad’ anti-drug defense line, which is actually a further strengthening of immigration restrictions and the construction of a ‘human border wall’; expanding military bases and patrol forces in the Caribbean to increase deterrence against disobedient Latin American countries... This is by no means a strategic shift of ‘laying down the butcher’s knife and becoming a Buddha on the spot,’ but rather the US retracting its overreaching fingers, clenching its fist, and then striking more precisely and forcefully at what it considers its ‘most urgent needs.’ “Alongside the control of geostrategic space, there is also the control of key resources. The report explicitly states the need to ‘strengthen relations with Latin American governments and cooperate in identifying strategic resources,’ and specifically emphasizes creating strategic acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies in the region. In other words, the US aims to grant its own companies priority in mining and operating resources, turning Latin America into a resource warehouse exclusively for the US, with the intention of firmly grasping Venezuelan oil, Chilean lithium, Mexican rare earths, and Brazilian agricultural products. Even more blatant is the military threat against Venezuela. The report’s preface boasts extensively about the US’s ‘preparations for war with Venezuela,’ highlighting an unprecedented $1 trillion military budget. Since late October, the US Navy has amassed a large number of ships and aircraft in the Caribbean Sea, sinking several small boats without concrete evidence and claiming to have killed more than 80 Venezuelan ‘drug traffickers.’ On December 9, the Miami Herald reported that two U.S. F-18 fighter jets entered Venezuelan airspace at noon that day and remained there for at least 40 minutes. Their flight path was between the two major energy-producing states of Zulia and Falcón. Given the White House’s recent repeated statements that the U.S. might ‘soon’ take action to crack down on Venezuelan drug traffickers by land, this is clearly an attempt to use Venezuela as a ‘sacrifice’ to demonstrate its power.”

From Rybar (A leading Russian military blogger)

“Thus, the Trump administration’s regional strategy is based on the principle of implanting American superiority through economic pressure, and if that doesn’t work, then by military intimidation. There’s no need to look far for examples in the form of Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela.”

From Feodor Voitolovsky, director of the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations

“Trump is returning to Theodore Roosevelt’s doctrine, according to which the United States reserves the right to interfere in the development of the political situation and international relations in certain countries of the Western Hemisphere. And Venezuela is serving as a test case here.”

“The document states: ‘The United States will reaffirm and implement the Monroe Doctrine to restore its preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and protect access to key geographies in the region. Competitors outside the hemisphere—particularly China and Russia—will be prevented from owning strategic assets such as ports, energy, and communications infrastructure in the region.’ “This approach reorients US foreign policy from a global focus (Middle East, Europe, Asia) to a regional priority (Western Hemisphere) and represents a fundamental shift from global interventionism to regional dominance.”

2. INTERPRETATIONS OF US STRATEGY TOWARD GLOBAL ADVERSARY NATIONS

Russian commentators believe that the stated US interest of achieving strategic stability and renewing cooperation with Russia is genuine and that this policy shift holds some positive implications for the country. However, the commentators are skeptical a dramatic turnabout in relations is at hand and don’t believe the US intends to cede more global influence to Russia. One Russian commentator notably suggested that the US strategy appears to call for a restoration of the 19th century “Concert of Europe”, with Moscow relegated to a position as one of several major European powers.

Chinese commentators believe that the US has shifted tactics in its strategic competition with China due to rising Chinese power. The softening tone by the second Trump administration is seen as a pragmatic move to avoid conflict in the short-term in order to gather strength for a longer term confrontation. These commentators believe that President Trump is not personally interested in defending Taiwan but faces resistance, both from within his administration and from East Asian partners, over the issue and will be eager to reach an accommodation with China to maintain the status quo.

Iranian commentators suggest the reprioritization of US effort away from the Middle East represents a victory for the Islamic Republic in the face of US pressure. Chinese and Russian commentators were more reserved in their assessment of US policy toward the Middle East.

“It is in the interests of the United States to negotiate an early end to hostilities in Ukraine in order to stabilize the European economy, prevent unintended escalation or widening of the conflict, and restore strategic stability in relations with Russia, as well as ensure the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.” […] “In other words, ending the military conflict in Ukraine is a strategic priority for the United States, and therefore, the Americans do not plan to cease their efforts as negotiators, but rather to intensify them. Russia, in the new administration’s view, is not a threat—it is described in a neutral, not negative, light.”

“It’s telling that Russia is presented not as an independent US interest or even a threat, but as part of the European picture. Washington sees its goal as facilitating the establishment of a European balance with Russia’s participation, primarily by changing the European approach (as they are currently incapable of such a change). Whether consciously or not, the Strategy’s authors are essentially expressing their wish: Russia should join the ‘European concert,’ which, once coherent, will become America’s accompanist. Moscow itself should not play a significant role in global politics. Paradoxically, liberal ideologists believed much the same after the Cold War, only their slogans were contradictory. “It’s encouraging that current American strategists aren’t placing Russia at the center of a fictional Mordor, as they recently did, but are taking a calm, pragmatic approach. However, the place they’re assigning us clearly doesn’t align with the country’s long-term strategic objectives. Even if we consider such a construct feasible, which is highly doubtful. Therefore, we study it carefully and do it our way.”

“In the short term, the US 2025 National Security Strategy report has softened its rhetoric regarding China’s ideology, leaving a window for negotiations to resume climate, agricultural, and energy purchases between the two countries. However, in the medium to long term, the US is using a ‘focused segmentation’ approach, concentrating its efforts on a protracted war of attrition against China. “‘First, while military conflict is manageable, pressure is increasing. The report states that the US possesses ‘The world’s most powerful and combat-ready military,’ explicitly proposing to offer a range of incentives to its Asian partners, such as high-tech cooperation and defense procurement. The report also prioritizes ‘deterring a conflict in the Taiwan Strait (ideally through maintaining military superiority)’ and ‘the capabilities needed to protect the first island chain,’ identifying the South China Sea as a ‘security challenge’ for the US and stating a commitment to ‘strong cooperation with all countries that could potentially suffer as a result (from India to Japan).’ This implies a decreased probability of direct clashes between the US and China, but gray-area friction (drones, cyberspace, electromagnetic) will become the norm. Furthermore, the US is no longer committing to increasing troop deployments in East Asia, instead selling more ‘area denial’ weapons to Japan, Australia, and South Korea, shifting frontline defense costs to its allies. The tension surrounding China remains high, but has shifted to a new formula of ‘proxies + unmanned systems.’ “Secondly, the economic battle has escalated from a ‘tariff war’ to a ‘supply chain encirclement.’ For the first time, the report incorporates ‘reindustrialization’ into the core of national security, proposing the construction of an ‘anti-China alliance’ in four key sectors: critical minerals, rare earths, semiconductors, and pharmaceutical raw materials. This alliance aims to gradually eliminate Chinese intermediate goods through ‘origin-based investigations + outsourcing to friendly coastal regions.’ Specific measures include suspending new tariffs but setting stricter thresholds, reducing tariff costs for Chinese companies while raising technological barriers; and prioritizing subsidies for Latin American ports, Australian lithium mines, Canadian rare earths, and Japanese and South Korean chip manufacturers, forming a containment chain intended to weaken China’s advantages in the global supply chain. “Third, the report offers ‘clearer tactics’ on the Taiwan issue. While placing Taiwan in a secondary chapter, it specifically names it eight times, demanding strengthened ‘collective defense’ with allies like Japan to prevent any ‘attempt to seize Taiwan.’ Compared to the Biden version, the Trump version deliberately avoids addressing ‘how to respond in the event of conflict,’ continuing to obscure the ‘whether to send troops,’ but it prioritizes allied defense and arms sales to Taiwan, essentially shifting the ‘tactical risks’ to regional partners, creating a new model of ‘US remote control, allies bearing the brunt.’ “This ‘focused segmentation’ approach by the US government avoids a direct ‘collision’ between China and the US, but it clearly reveals its intention to increase the difficulty for China in dealing with related issues.

“Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao reported that the latest U.S. National Security Strategy report mentions China 19 times, no longer emphasizing systemic competition with China, but instead stressing ‘rebalancing the U.S.-China economic relationship with reciprocity and fairness as priorities.’ “Unlike previous reports, the term ‘China’ first appears on page 19 of the main text in this report, with a greater focus on the so-called ‘economic power of China.’ The report emphasizes the necessity of winning economic competition in Asia and rebalancing trade with China, noting that to achieve this, the United States needs to cooperate with its Asian allies to counterbalance China. The report specifically mentions India in this section, stating that the United States ‘must continue to improve its commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security.’” […] “Zhu Feng stated that although the strategy did not explicitly emphasize ‘China as the United States’ biggest strategic competitor’ in its wording, the US policy toward China has not actually changed. He believes that the shift in the report’s tone regarding China ‘also reflects the Trump administration’s current domestic and foreign policy priorities of “domestic first, foreign second”.’” “‘Therefore, we must not have any illusions that Trump’s competitive strategy of regarding China as the biggest strategic competitor has undergone a substantial adjustment,’ he said. ‘What Trump seeks is to engage in long-term confrontation with China through the reindustrialization of the United States and the reinvestment in manufacturing. The adjustment in wording also largely reflects the focus of the US strategy of suppressing China and the adjustment of the thinking and methods of long-term strategic competition between China and the United States.’ “Diao Daming’s view is relatively more optimistic. He believes that although one cannot conclude from the surface text of the report that ‘great power competition has completely disappeared or has shifted,’ it is more accurate to say that ‘in the past, the United States engaged in strategic competition with China in the sense of so-called strategic rebalancing, but now it has shifted more towards economic rebalancing.’ “‘The competition between China and the United States may primarily manifest itself in national strength and influence in the future, rather than in a Cold War-style narrative, and not in a “life-or-death struggle” but in a “struggle for superiority”,’ he said. “‘If Trump’s ideas continue, then the future Sino-US relationship is very likely to present different situations in different areas,’ Diao Daming further analyzed. ‘For example, in areas involving national core competitiveness, China and the US will still face a situation of ‘decoupling’ and strong competition; in areas with common interests such as trade and economy, there may be a situation of constant differences and a balance that is eventually achieved through means such as fighting to promote talks; while in areas such as values, ideology, geopolitics, and military security, the two sides may have the opportunity to maintain a weak and fragile balance.’”

“Currently, some popular viewpoints, such as ‘the United States has abandoned its global hegemony,’ ‘Sino-US relations have entered a phase of equal competition in the economic and trade fields,’ and ‘the US national security strategy has undergone a major shift,’ are quite prevalent. However, we believe these are merely strategic misjudgments resulting from short-sighted analyses that focus solely on individual cases and textual interpretations. A deeper understanding of the logic behind US national issues and Trump’s own ideological logic reveals that many of these popular viewpoints are untenable. “We believe that, judging from Trump’s views on China policy, there are several ‘changes’ and ‘unchanged aspects’ in the US’s attitude towards China and Sino-US relations, which has become the current cold reality of Sino-US relations. We cannot naively imagine that the US national security strategy has undergone a major irreversible setback and become complacent, nor can we be anxious and panicked because of the US. We should calmly grasp the cold reality of the development of Sino-US relations.” […] “From the initial concept of a ‘G2’ co-governance between the US and China during Obama’s era, to the gradual shift towards the Asia-Pacific rebalancing, and then to Trump’s first term and Biden’s era, the US has drawn the ‘iron curtain’ of a ‘new Cold War,’ positioning China as its biggest challenger. Even today, prior to the summit between the two leaders in Busan, Trump has again raised the ‘G2’ concept, exploring competition with China based on spheres of influence. The strategic rivalry between the two major powers has essentially entered a tug-of-war for ‘long-term peace.’ These changes demonstrate that the relationship between the US and China has irreversibly shifted from a strategic partnership to a ‘competitive’ relationship. While US policy towards China has softened somewhat during Trump 2.0, the essence is merely a change in the methods, concepts, and approaches of competition; the strategic positioning of the two countries as competitors remains unchanged. This shift is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” […] “During his first term, Trump believed that America’s problems were caused by China, thus making anti-China sentiment a primary objective. In his second term, he recognized that America’s problems stemmed from its own internal issues and focused on deep-seated domestic reforms rather than shifting blame to China. However, Trump hoped China could provide some assistance in addressing America’s internal problems. Currently, Trump believes China has profited excessively from the US in the past and hopes China will make concessions in future trade negotiations to alleviate the US trade deficit and government debt. What Trump needs is China’s cooperation and assistance, not unconditional confrontation and containment of China. “Therefore, in his second term, Trump is eager to reach a trade agreement with China, but unwilling to get involved in the Taiwan issue, the sovereignty of islands in the South China Sea, or the recent setbacks in Sino-Japanese relations. Based on national strength, Trump has to some extent acknowledged China’s dominant role in East Asian affairs, and will not easily challenge China or try to contain China by inviting Japan or using Taiwan as leverage.” […] “The relationship between China and the United States remains one of all-round strategic competition. The US also recognizes that a new model of great power competition, centered on the technology and industry, is generally peaceful and, if handled properly, can enable China and the US to jointly advance human technological and industrial progress, rather than reverting to the resource-intensive great power confrontation pattern of the Cold War era, which was centered on nuclear deterrence and military balance. “Although the US security strategy under Trump has been somewhat scaled back, the substantive structural contradictions in Sino-US relations have not been resolved. First, fundamental differences remain between the two countries in political systems, ideologies, and human rights concepts. Second, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved; even if the US is unwilling to provoke on Taiwan, it will not welcome reunification. Third, the unbalanced economic and trade structure between China and the US—the US’s consumerist society and China’s savings-oriented society—has not yet been reversed, and the model of US extravagant consumption and China’s hard-earned profits is no longer sustainable. Fourth, the US will continue to insist on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and ‘rules-based governance’ in the region.” […] “During Trump’s term, the restructuring of the global order and Sino-US relations will be an ongoing process. The US now has a clearer understanding of the boundaries and rules of strategic competition between China and the US, and has strived to adhere to the principles of not overstepping boundaries, not escalating, and not engaging in conflict in its public pronouncements and actions. Conversely, there may be an overly optimistic or overly pessimistic tendency in my country’s strategic academic circles and among the public. The release of this ‘Text’ does not represent a major irreversible shift in US national strategy. We should seriously consider the essence of this new type of great power competition and further return to a development path centered on technological progress and industrial upgrading to comprehensively enhance national strength.”

“Iran—through economic resilience, defense advances, and direct retaliation against Israel—has shifted from a ‘containable threat’ to a ‘firmly established regional power.’

“The 2025 document explicitly removes the Middle East from its top priorities, describing it as an ‘investment partner’ rather than a source of ongoing crises. ‘The days when the Middle East dominated U.S. foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are fortunately over,’ the document states on page 28, ‘not because the Middle East no longer matters, but because it is no longer a constant source of provocation and impending disaster.’ “The document claims that this approach is rooted in diversifying energy sources and transforming the United States into a net oil exporter, reducing its historical dependence on the region. Washington claims that its focus is on a ‘pivot to Asia’ and seeks to create a deterrent against China. “However, these claims do not match the practical realities. In the past year, the US military presence in West Asia has increased; for example, the June 2025 operation known as ‘Midnight Hammer’ against Iranian nuclear facilities was the most visible form of overt US intervention. “This contradiction shows that the new US policy of defiance is more a tool to justify ideological retreat than a reflection of real policies, which continue to intervene through indirect pressure. In the new approach, the US initiates the crisis with a military or political move, leaves it to its allies to end it, and only benefits financially without paying any costs.”

3. INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE STRATEGY SAYS ABOUT US DOMESTIC POLITICS

There is a general consensus among Russian, Chinese and Iranian commentators that the US is adopting a profit-maximizing approach to international relations, treating governance as business. They expect the US to prioritize re-industrialization over globalization, fossil fuel exports over commitments to fighting climate change, pragmatic dealings with authoritarian governments over promotion of human rights, and cost-shifting to allies over burden-sharing.

There is some skepticism that the Trump administration’s strategy will be adhered to closely by President Trump, as he acts impulsively and has dramatically changed his own position since his first term.

Commentators are divided as to whether the current strategy will outlast the Trump administration due to US political polarization.

“As a businessman-turned-politician, Trump unconsciously incorporates corporate governance principles into his governance of the country. We might think of the United States as a superpower corporation (the world’s only superpower), with Trump as its CEO (both ‘president’ and ‘CEO’ can be ‘President’ in English). How can we understand Trump’s governance of the United States from a corporate governance perspective, and thus gain insight into the deeper logic behind ‘Strategy’? “I. The Strategy is a projection of President Trump’s management philosophy onto the governance of the country. “This version of the ‘Strategy’ is heavily influenced by Trump’s personal views and is a concentrated exposition of his political ideology. More accurately, it is Trump’s national security strategy for his second term. There is no evidence that this will be the choice of his successor (even if a Republican candidate takes over). Therefore, the ‘Strategy’ is less a ‘national security strategy of the United States’ and more a ‘Trump version of the national security strategy of the United States.’ The currently popular assertion of a ‘major strategic shift in the United States’ is premature. “(a) Five major ‘deficits’ faced by American mega-corporations “When Trump took over the U.S. government for a second term, this mega-corporation faced five major deficits: “1. Global Hegemonic Governance Deficit “The United States established the post-World War II international order. In order to maintain its global hegemony and stability, it has maintained a massive military expenditure and international organization system, resulting in a huge burden on global governance. “2. Moral Deficit of Freedom “Because of its firm belief in the inherent human rights and the supremacy of human rights, the United States has chosen to turn a blind eye to the long-standing problem of illegal immigration, which has led to the unbearable burden it faces today. “3. Operating cost deficit “The existence of a massive state apparatus and a deep-seated government, coupled with the need for strong and rigorous oversight, has resulted in a heavy financial burden for the state. “4. National debt deficit “Due to the consumerist social structure of the United States and its quagmire of war, the national debt continues to exceed the limit, and the Strategy also acknowledges that ‘the United States’ current account deficit is unsustainable.’ “5. Industrial ‘hollowing out’ and resulting losses “Since the 1990s, by embracing internet information technology and financialization and globalization, the United States has gradually outsourced its industries, resulting in the virtualization of its domestic economy and the hollowing out of its industries. Furthermore, it has gradually allowed rival countries to acquire strong manufacturing capabilities, thereby threatening the security of its own industrial and supply chains.”

From Dmitri Simes, professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) University

“The US’s ability to pursue a coherent foreign policy is limited by deep domestic polarization and election cycles. The recent loss of important Republican positions (Miami, Tennessee, Virginia) indicates high political turbulence. “When analyzing US foreign policy, it is important to remember that very real changes are indeed taking place in America in many respects, and these should not be underestimated; however, Trump’s policies remain largely unpredictable. In these circumstances, it is necessary to assess the situation pragmatically and not jump to hasty conclusions.”

“In terms of economic policy, Trump’s team is copying the president’s election program and declaring the principles of ‘protectionism and reindustrialization’. They even directly compare Trump’s foreign policy with the Monroe Doctrine. “However, in reality, there is no talk of protectionism at all. Technological corporations like Oracle and Palantir, as well as financial and military-industrial TNCs, have only strengthened their positions and intensified their expansion under Trump. It’s just that the left-liberal ideology has so far given way to a new trend of Republican conservatism.”

“The author has written repeatedly about how the ‘right-wing conservative project’ in the United States, personified by Donald Trump, envisions the future world order. For example, in the article ‘The World Will Be Divided into Two Camps,’ the author noted that if the Republicans win, Washington will seek to maintain the United States’ leading role in the world, while leaning toward isolationism and maintaining a high level of protectionism, while international organizations will likely lose their significance.” […] “Restoring America’s energy dominance in oil, gas, coal, and nuclear power is a top priority for the country. Affordable and accessible energy will create well-paying jobs in the United States, lower costs for American consumers and businesses, and foster reindustrialization. It will also help maintain our leadership in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence.” […] “In addition to the above, the Strategy also states that for the ‘prosperity of the American nation’ to flourish, ‘a growing number of strong, traditional families raising healthy children’ is necessary. This reference to traditional values ​​is quite typical of the new right-wing conservative (or rather national-conservative) American administration. This partially overlaps with some Russian political talking points (though they sometimes don’t always correspond to reality), as Dmitry Peskov recently noted, stating that ‘the adjustments we are seeing, I would say, are largely consistent with our vision.’ “Overall, for a white conservative American, the new US National Security Strategy is like music to American ears. It’s undeniable that it seems appropriate to any sensible person. In this regard, it’s not surprising that Trump is popular with many right-wing conservatives and nationalists in Europe, who would like to see their national governments also strive for something similar.”

Battle_Biscuits on December 12nd, 2025 at 12:50 UTC »

This is indeed a fascinating read.

I find the Chinese analysis of this report especially astute.

'The report openly states its intention to cultivate resistance forces in Europe and support so-called ‘patriotic European parties.’ This is tantamount to fostering far-right forces in Europe and blatantly interfering in the internal affairs of European countries. Polish Prime Minister Tusk couldn’t help but appeal to the White House on social media: ‘Europe is your closest ally, not your problem.’ But the United States completely ignores this. The report clearly states that it aims to help Europe restore national sovereignty, support European identity and nationalism, but in reality, it still demands that Europe obediently follow the United States’ lead.

At least the Chinese only discreetly interfere with European politics, whereas with Trump it is now its official policy.

> The US is making European countries spend more money to defend against Russia while simultaneously talking about strategic stability with Russia itself.

Yet another painful irony.

The really infuriating thing I find about this is that the authors behind this document think they have a right to dictate what Europe ought to be, despite not being European themselves. As long as we're treating our own people justly and fairly, how we run our internal affairs and develop our societies is nobody's business but our own. You need something like genocide or crimes against humanity to legitimise coercive external intervention in the affairs of another country.

DoomerDebunked on December 12nd, 2025 at 03:02 UTC »

Everyday Americans do not believe they are living in a fascist regime and everyday Americans do not know what NATO is. Everyday Americans certainty do not want to be further involved in foreign entanglements, the outcomes of which make little difference in their everyday lives. Reddit is so consumed in anti Trump hatred it has been rendered unable to have intelligent conversations on world affairs.

The fact of the matter is this: China and the USA are the competing powers of this day and age, and Europe offers little on this matter. This comes simultaneously as Russia has proven to be a shadow of its former self with an economy smaller than Italy. Trump is absolutely right that it’s time for Europe to handle itself and for America to focus on containing China and making sure Russian and Chinese influence in Latin America is curtailed.

The Europeans complaining about this are the same nations who for decades refused to take NATO seriously and insulted Americans as warmongers for doing the dirty work to advance collective western interests. FAFO fools. It’s not 1995 anymore the world is moving on.

Due_Search_8040 on December 12nd, 2025 at 01:42 UTC »

SS: This post provides an alternative perspective on the controversial new US National Security Policy. It summarizes the opinions of political commentators in China, Russia, and Iran on how the strategy affects them, what it means for US’s role as global superpower, and what it says about American domestic politics. The summary does not endorse these beliefs or offer an assessment on the actual merits of the policy, but highlights how influential voices in adversarial nations are discussing the policy change with domestic audiences.