Africa must create a bloc like the EU to have real global power

As geopolitical competition increases, African states face growing pressure to pick sides. Sanusha Naidu, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Dialogue, argues that real agency will not come from choosing between external powers, but from strengthening Africa’s own regional institutions—especially the AfCFTA—to shape investment, bolster bargaining power, and build a coherent continental market.

In August 2025, Botswana’s state-owned development corporation signed a huge $12 billion investment deal with Qatar’s Al Mansour Holdings with the potential to reshape the African nation’s economy. The agreement promises investment in roads, farming, mining, diamond refinement, energy, defense, and cybersecurity.

But there is also speculation that the proposed deal could allow the government of Botswana to purchase the 85% stake in the De Beers diamond company that its owner Anglo American is seeking to sell off. The government already owns a 15% stake; Qatar’s backing could allow Botswana to take full control. As yet, there is no confirmation. In 2024, the diamond market collapsed, hitting Botswana hard. The timing of Qatar’s investment is not coincidental—the Gulf state has its own interests in becoming a trading hub for precious metals and gemstones. Backing Botswana’s bid for De Beers would give it significant leverage in the global diamond trade.

This story highlights a number of significant issues facing African nations. It demonstrates the liquidity constraints faced by African governments when competing for stakes in ownership structures. It reveals the rising strategic interest of Gulf investors, particularly the UAE and Qatar, in becoming dominant players in Africa’s critical minerals and energy sectors. It also exposes the tension between national industrial ambitions and regional competition— currently, for example, Angola is also vying to compete with Botswana for the De Beers stake.

With weak regional frameworks guiding investment, African countries risk entering bilateral deals that, while beneficial nationally, do not advance regional markets or support intra-African trade.

It also underscores the core challenge: with weak regional frameworks guiding investment, African countries risk entering bilateral deals that, while beneficial nationally, do not advance regional markets or support intra-African trade. The question, therefore, becomes: How can these national projects be aligned with regional priorities?

Africa’s intra-regional trade levels remain among the lowest globally—typically between 14 and 17% of total trade. The continent’s major trading partner remains the European Union. China is deeply embedded, but its trade volumes with Africa (approximately US$250–300 billion) are relatively small when compared with its bilateral trade with single countries such as Vietnam, which can reach similarly high levels.

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The current pattern shows the degree to which African exports are concentrated in commodities. Value-added intra-African trade is limited by tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, and poor connectivity. The goal for African states should not be to reduce global trade, but to optimize leverage and channel external investments into building regional markets and industrial bases. This is where customs unions and common external tariffs become critical. Harmonized tariffs reduce distortions, support regional manufacturing, and prevent individual states from undercutting one another in negotiations with external investors.

Africa needs a single market, and the plan for the African Continental Free Trade Area, or AfCFTA, was launched in 2021 with the aim of creating this. 54 out of Africa’s 55 nations have signed up to it, with Eritrea the only holdout. The AfCFTA is central to any argument for enhancing African agency. If effectively implemented, it can transform fragmented national markets into a unified continental market of 1.3 billion people with a combined GDP exceeding USD 3.4 trillion.

The AfCFTA would oversee the elimination of economically harmful tariffs that currently cover 97% of goods traded within Africa. It would provide protocols on investment, establishing much-needed transparency standards that would be consistent across the continent. It would provide systems for settling disputes, creating the predictability for investors and governments. It would set out rules on trade in financial, transport, communication and professional services which would help grow e-commerce and digital economies. And it would create rules of origin designed to grow regional value chains.

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Instead of negotiating access to narrow national markets, African governments could leverage the AfCFTA to offer investors access to larger regional markets, increasing their bargaining power. The AfCFTA would allow African states to trade more predictably and profitably with one another while attracting a wider range of external investment, allowing African nations to be less reliant on Chinese and Gulf funding.

Despite aspirations for regionalism, Africa’s international economic engagements remain overwhelmingly bilateral. The reasons are structural and political. Domestic political economy often shapes investment choices more than regional considerations. Governments prioritize national development needs, electoral cycles, and domestic constituencies. Investors tend to prefer bilateral deals for clarity, speed, and policy certainty. A patchwork of varied regulatory frameworks prevent cross-border investment planning, and regional processes are slow, complex, and legally cumbersome. And even where regional frameworks exist, national institutions often lack the capacity or political determination to implement them.

Instead of negotiating access to narrow national markets, African governments could leverage the AfCFTA to offer investors access to larger regional markets, increasing their bargaining power.

Given that bilateral deals currently appear preferable, the challenge is not to eliminate bilateralism but to embed it within a two-tier approach: states should negotiate bilaterally while anchoring agreements in regional frameworks and ensuring alignment with AfCFTA principles. This two-tier approach acknowledges domestic constraints while pushing toward continental coherence.

There is plenty to gain from this. Africa has a vast demographic advantage—as of 2025, the continent hosts the world’s largest youth population. If African countries can use the AfCFTA to create regional markets, they can negotiate as regional blocs, rather than isolated states, and enhance their bargaining power. They can collectively ensure that bilateral investments also serve regional industrial plans, creating positive-sum outcomes for the whole region. They can use AfCFTA’s Protocol on Investment to standardize investor obligations, creating important protections for the environment, for example. They can also roll out cross-border e-commerce and digital payment ecosystems, which will reduce the transaction costs that currently undermine intra-African trade.

African agency will not emerge from rejecting external partners nor from reverting to isolated national strategies. Instead, agency will come from the ability of African states to negotiate terms that serve national interests while advancing regional integration. The AfCFTA provides a coherent set of rules, standards, and opportunities that can be used to shape external engagements, domestic industrial policy, and long-term development trajectories. The market of the future is in Africa itself—young, growing, and increasingly urban. If African states use the AfCFTA wisely, this century will see African agency dramatically rise in an evolving global order.