Moscow Alarmed by Revival and Spread of Promethean Ideas

In memory of Janusz Bugajski, friend, colleague, and promoter of Promethean Ideas

Moscow is increasingly alarmed by the spread of Prometheanism, a set of ideas developed in pre-war Poland that posits that the Muscovite state is an empire, joint efforts can best achieve its end, and its demise will bring more good than harm.

This trend is attracting expanded Russian attention as Kyiv attempts to expand its ties with non-Russians within President Vladimir Putin’s Russia and other countries, and analysts promote Promethean ideas in Russia and abroad.

Russian propagandists now feel compelled to treat Prometheanism not as some dusty relic from an increasingly distant past but rather as an immediate threat to Russia requiring a forceful response from Moscow.

Moscow is increasingly alarmed by the revival and spread of Prometheanism, a set of ideas developed in pre-World War II Poland. Marshal Pilsudski sought to use these ideas to weaken Russia by developing close ties with the non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union and encouraging them to pursue their independence (For background on this movement, which remains little studied, see Etienne Copeaux, “Le mouvement prométhéen,” Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien 18(1993): 9–45; Richard Woytak, “The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland,” East European Quarterly, 18:3 (1984): 273–78; Marek Chodakiewicz, Intermarium (New Jersey, 2012); and Janusz Bugajski, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture (Washington, 2022). If the details of the Polish program and operations have been largely forgotten, three key ideas lying behind Warsaw’s actions never completely died out. These ideas include the conviction that the Muscovite state is and remains an empire; that its end can best be gained by the coordinated efforts of all non-Russians with the support of Western governments; and that the demise of the empire will bring both groups more benefits than the costs Moscow and its supporters routinely warn about. During the Cold War, Promethean ideas were kept alive by Poles who emigrated to the West, including, most prominently, Lev Dobriansky, a Polish American diplomat and scholar who was instrumental in securing the adoption of the U.S. Captive Nations Week resolution in 1959, and Polish American scholar and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

These embers of Prometheanism have burst into flame and attracted influence for two reasons. On the one hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led Kyiv to reach out to and form alliances with non-Russians inside the Russian Federation against Moscow. Ukraine has also provided a haven to non-Russian leaders forced to flee from Russian oppression. These actions clearly have Promethean roots and have encouraged those who fled Russia to work together rather than at cross-purposes (see EDM, January 24, 2024, October 16). On the other hand, these flames have expanded due to new investigations, such as those by Marek Chodakiewicz, as well as the research and actions of Janusz Bugajski. Until his passing on October 17, Bugajski was perhaps the most prominent leader of efforts to explicitly spread Promethean ideas both in Western countries and especially among non-Russian activists (see Promethean Liberation, accessed October 23). These efforts were made to both prevent Moscow from using its traditional divide-and-rule tactics against them and ultimately to achieve independence for themselves and the final demise of the Russian empire (Free Nations, New States, accessed October 23)

The work of Bugajski and others has been influential in the Russian Federation and its neighbors. How this influence has convinced many non-Russians and frightened Moscow has been well documented (Polskiego Radia, September 8, 2020; Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, November 11, 2021; Kavkaz.Realii, February 10, 2023; Eurasia Today, November 4, 2024). Perhaps the best evidence of this influence is provided by the Russian reaction, which has shifted from treating Prometheanism as some dusty relic of an increasingly distant past and focusing on it by name as a direct threat to the Russian Federation and even to world peace (RITM Eurasia, October 17; Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, October 21). These attacks focus not only on Ukraine and Poland but also, importantly, on non-Russians, whom they say have been misled by the siren songs of the Prometheans and on foreign scholars such as Bugaski, who, as these writers specify, are enemies of Russia. Moscow even went so far as to declare The Jamestown Foundation “an undesirable organization” in 2020 for platforming Promethean-type ideas (Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia, April 8, 2020; see Jamestown Foundation, April 9, 2020).

Moscow clearly fears that adopting a Promethean perspective is opening the way for expanded foreign influence among non-Russians in Russia. The Kremlin fears that this expanded foreign influence will reduce Moscow’s leverage of keeping these peoples not only apart from the West but also apart from one another. The Kremlin fears that the potential unity among these people, driven by foreign influence, will limit Moscow’s influence over them and its ability to counter their activities through divide-and-rule tactics (Window on Eurasia, April 23, 2023). Such Russian attacks may be viewed as little more than an example of the kind of emotionalism which characterizes much of Moscow’s commentary on Ukraine, Poland, and Westerners who support Kyiv against Moscow—after all, the title of one such article is “Polish Prometheanism is Ready to Drown Eurasia in Blood” (RITM Eurasia, October 17). There is, however, an additional reason to believe that its articles about Prometheanism and its growth are something Moscow views as far more serious, and that it may be planning to take more dramatic measures to block the spread of such ideas.

That involves Russian attacks on the Promethean Center for Security Research in Lviv (Promethen Center for Security Research in Lviv, accessed October 23). According to Russian commentator Vladislav Gulevich, that Kyiv set up this research center in Lviv shows that Ukraine’s actions are based on the ideology of pre-war Polish Prometheanism (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, November 5, 2021). He says that this linkage is evident because:

The Promethean Center in Lviv occupies itself with provoking discord among the peoples of the Russian Federation, casting doubt on the federative status of the Russian state, coming up with ‘facts’ of the oppression of non-Russians … and attempting to consolidate national activists in Russia for organizing ‘national resistance’ (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, November 5, 2021).

Gulevich concludes by saying that it is “no accident” that the center is supported by Georgians and Canadians who want to weaken Russia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine appears to have forced the center to suspend operations, which undoubtedly pleases those such as Gulevich who fear what the revival of Prometheanism means.

Right up to the final weeks of his life, Bugajski continued to push a Promethean agenda. He met with representatives of non-Russian national movements now forced to live abroad to promote cooperation among them. He met alongside these leaders the representatives of Western governments. He was forthright in insisting that the decolonization of the Muscovite empire would bring greater benefits to the peoples living within its borders and to the world as a whole, and pose far less risk than maintaining a single state based in Moscow. As such, and even after his death, Bugajski will remain a hero for those peoples and an intellectual guide for all people of goodwill who care about their survival and the avoidance of new wars that the continued existence of a unified Russia maintained by force would certainly entail. The author of these lines is proud to have known him as a colleague and a friend, and like so many others, will miss his important and clearly expressed message.