The Daily Populous Wednesday October 8th, 2025 morning edition
Authored by newyorker.com and submitted by newyorker

The war in Gaza may be on the verge of ending. It began two years ago, when Hamas launched an attack on southern Israel, killing nearly twelve hundred people and taking two hundred and fifty hostage. Israel then commenced a military campaign in the Gaza Strip. During that time, more than sixty-seven thousand Palestinians have been killed, and more than a hundred and sixty-nine thousand have been injured; a United Nations commission recently described Israel’s actions as genocide. Since taking office in January, President Donald Trump has continued to steadfastly support the Israeli government, even when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered a complete cutoff of aid into Gaza for more than two months. But Trump has also grown tired of Netanyahu’s unwillingness to stop a war that Trump himself wants credit for bringing to a close. Last week, in Washington, Trump pressured Netanyahu into accepting a deal that would trade the approximately twenty remaining Israeli hostages for some two thousand Palestinians currently held in Israeli jails, and call for Hamas fighters to disarm in exchange for amnesty. The plan also envisions an international board—chaired by Trump—to oversee Gaza for at least a temporary period.

I recently spoke by phone with Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to try to understand what a deal might look like and why it might finally be close to happening. A former State Department employee, Miller played a role in Middle East peace negotiations across multiple Administrations—most notably under Bill Clinton. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why Netanyahu felt more pressure to agree to a deal this time, Hamas’s calculations about previously refusing to release hostages, and why long-term hopes for peace—let alone for a Palestinian state—remain so unlikely.

Why does this time feel different in terms of the prospects for a deal? Why now, in other words?

I think there are three factors, and they’ve been hovering for a while, but now they have more or less all come together. First, I really do think that Hamas, even though there’s a major split between the external and internal leadership, has reached the point where political survival is going to outweigh ideology. That has increased the margin for maneuver. Some of the Hamas hard-liners who planned October 7th have been killed by the Israelis. And there was the September 9th strike on Qatar, the base of Hamas’s political wing, and the site of negotiations throughout the war. [On that date, Israel bombed a residential neighborhood in Doha in an attempt to kill Hamas negotiators. Netanyahu, at Trump’s urging, later apologized to Qatar’s Prime Minister.] That paradoxically generated the current resolve and intensity to get a deal, and I think it has brought even the internal leadership to this realization.

By internal, you mean the military leadership within Gaza?

Yeah. I mean the brigade commanders, particularly Izz al-Din al-Haddad, who commands the Gaza City brigade. The Israelis are really focussed on Gaza City. They believe that Gaza City is where the remnants of Hamas’s organized military force are. They really are remnants at this point. They’re operating now in small teams with very little command and control—capable of insurgency, but no longer what you would call an organized or conventional military that can use rockets or mount cross-border incursions. So I think there’s growing pressure.

But that factor would not be determinative alone. Then you come to the second factor, which is that the Trump Administration, frankly, has succeeded with all of its courting and focus on the Gulf states. For this President, it’s an intersection of his financial interests, the Trump Organization’s business interests, the flattery, and the authoritarian delight that he derives from dealing with leaders who have no democratic constraints and can do basically anything. They got the gift of the plane from the Qataris. [Qatar gave a Boeing 747 to Trump, who is expected to use it as Air Force One.] All of that combined to help the Administration create more pressure on the Gulf states. And the Qataris have now been struck twice as a consequence of Israeli actions. The first was when the Iranians retaliated symbolically after the American strike on the three Iranian nuclear sites, in June. [Iran, with advanced warning to prevent escalation, struck a Qatari airbase that houses American forces.] The Qataris want to be players. And now they are able to say that they pushed the President, which gives them more heft and more reach for a small country. At the same time, they don’t want to lose their relationship with Hamas, but they do want this over, and they don’t want more Israeli strikes on Doha.

Trump has also been pushing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, with whom his relationship has gotten warmer. There are two main state supporters of Hamas other than the Iranians: the Turks and the Qataris. So Trump has sort of informally put together a coalition.

But let’s be very clear that Hamas’s newfound flexibility would not by itself have brought about this deal. The third factor is the key, and I must say I don’t believe in transformations, game changers, sea changes, or inflection points, but there has never been an American Presidential push on Israel like this, with the possible exception of the ultimatum Dwight Eisenhower made to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that he would impose political and economic sanctions in 1956.

Psychological-Flow55 on October 8th, 2025 at 00:43 UTC »

Hamas disarming is key, and a safe passage out of the Gaza Strip to third party countries who will let them in disarmed and influence very limited, and away from Israel/palestinan territories limiting their capabilities.

The hostages must be freed, even if it means a certain amount of Palestinan prisoners are exchanged as a goodwill gesture.

The countries that want to contribute to a international peacekeeping force that would include countries like indonesia, the UAE, and Eureopean partners, put up a dmz like zone between Israel and Gaza, plus securing the Israeli-Egyptian borders, including the dismantling of these complex tunnels. A international effort with arab, and eureopean funding in the reconstruction and investment of the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip, and a UAE, and Saudi led de-radicalization program aimed at circulmns, textbooks/education, a a reformist forum of islam (instead of muslim Brotherhood, Salafi or Taliban style deobandi like versions of Sunni Islam), similar to the reforms that we see taking place in Saudi Arabia under MBS, and The UAE under MBZ, plus a technocratic intermin palestinan govt that every has input in.

Hopefully there a deal, hopefully Turkey and Qatar can pressure Hamas to cut a deal for the sake of any hope of a pathway to a Palestinan state of some form that also recoganizes Israel security, and right to exsit.

All of the aboove would also help stabilize the region especially Egypt, with the leadership can now say they "saved Palestine" to their populations and prevent a Islamist comeback by either the Muslim Brotherhoodor hardline Salafis, and can then concentrate on stabilizing their economy, Jordan likewise can say to their people that the Palestinans in a final deal accepts israel right to exsit, that Jordan sacrificed for the Palestinans by the airdrops of humantarian aid, playing a role in the post war reconstruction of gaza, and building of the field hospitals during the crisis, and seeks to gain economically from the rebuilding of Gaza, of course Oman who Sultan feels Oman influence has had weakened as a mediator between regional powers, and feel the war has increased the radicalization in the mosques (that where showing support for Hamas since oct.7th), and sees the growing influence, and popularity in Oman of the grand mufti (who has praised Pakistan as "victorious against India", and threatened India about "remember how Muslims treated you during the caliphate ", as well as supporting Hamas since oct.7th, prasing oct.7th as "liberation" , and lastly supporting the houthis attacks on the red sea and Israel, and against the saudi led coalition in yemen) can stabilize the situation in Oman and remind the mufti not to push too far, and say Oman is reclaiming it place as mediator in the region. The post-war situation (if all goes well), can also help all the key players in the region economically integrate as the states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, etc. have economic vision plans that includes diversification of the economy away from oil, aviation, music and sports entertainment, big internal projects, huge investments in A.I. , etc., Israel can play a key role in certain areas like agriculture technology, tourism, investments, Trade deals, and code sharing with Turkish, Gulf and other regional airlines.

I pray this war ends soon, and that the hostages are released, humantarian aid flows into Gaza, a peace keeping force can deploy, that will allow for a cooling off between the jewish and Arab populations, and real work can begin to bring lasting stability in the region.

But Hamas must disarm and leave Gaza for the sake of any survival for Palestinan statehood, the two state solution , and for Bibi to lose support in Israel and a moderate can get serious negotiations going.

dantoddd on October 8th, 2025 at 00:42 UTC »

Isn't Hamas asking for the Oct 7 attackers to be released. That seems like a clear red line.

fuggitdude22 on October 7th, 2025 at 23:58 UTC »

Hamas disarming is instrumental for this conflict to be resolved. If not, we are just kicking the can down the line like we did in the prior Israel-Hamas Wars.