The Daily Populous Sunday August 24th, 2025 day edition
Authored by opforjournal.com and submitted by Due_Search_8040

This week's analysis highlights some of the most significant news concerning America's adversaries between August 16, 2025 - August 23, 2025.

Russia challenges US proposals for direct talks with Zelensky and security guarantees for Ukraine. China conducts a diplomatic tour of South Asia amid a Trump Administration pivot from India to Pakistan. China conducts a large show of force in Filipino territorial waters near Second Thomas Shoal. North Korea publicly honors its new war veterans and fallen soldiers, and promotes its military actions in Kursk.

1. KREMLIN REBUFFS PROPOSAL FOR PUTIN-ZELENSKY TALKS AND SECURITY GUARANTEES

In a press conference on August 21, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Russia was in no hurry to arrange direct talks between President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Lavrov stated that any eventual leaders’ meeting to end the war would come after a lengthy process of negotiations, and that such a meeting would only be possible after Ukraine solved its “issue of the legitimacy” of its President.

"Our president has said on multiple occasions that he is ready to meet, including with Mr. Zelensky, with understanding that all issues that need to be addressed at the summit level are well considered and experts, ministers prepare respective recommendations. Of course, with understanding that when and if - I hope when - it comes to signing the future agreements, the issue of the legitimacy of the person to sign the agreements on the part of Ukraine will be resolved."

Lavrov went one step further and appeared on American television to highlight the legitimacy issue. In an interview with NBC News on August 22, Lavrov decried the prospect of direct negotiations with Zelensky:

“How can we meet with a person who is pretending to be a leader?”

Lavrov also threw cold water on the prospect of Moscow approving substantive security guarantees to Ukraine.

“I am sure that in the West and above all in the United States they understand perfectly well that seriously discussing security issues without the Russian Federation is a utopia; it’s a road to nowhere.”

Russian officials, especially Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly claimed that final negotiations to end the war are complicated by the supposed illegitimacy of the Zelensky government. The most recent iteration of this claim is that President Zelensky no longer has an official mandate to lead the country since Ukraine has not held elections since it was invaded on February 23, 2022. NOTE: Ukraine’s Constitution prevents elections from being held during periods of martial law. Holding elections would therefore either require dropping martial law (unthinkable for a country fighting a war of national survival) or amending Ukraine’s Constitution, another impossibility as Article 158 of Ukraine’s Constitution prohibits amendments during wartime. However, this “legitimacy” issue for Russia is much more fundamental. The Kremlin will not recognize any Ukrainian government that does not accept its suzerainty. The entire “Special Military Operation” was predicated on the Ukrainian government being an illegitimate, “Nazi” regime. Vladimir Putin said as much during his February 24, 2022 address announcing the start of the invasion. “The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” -Vladimir Putin, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” February 24, 2022 Having a meeting between Zelensky and Putin would effectively delegitimize Russia’s entire war effort and would create a potential existential crisis for the Putin regime. The Kremlin is very sensitive to this issue because it fears that popular Russian nationalist Z-bloggers may react furiously to any perceived capitulation on maximalist war aims. A dramatic armed insurrection similar to the 2023 Wagner Group “March of Justice” is unlikely due to extensive government crackdowns over the past two years, but discontent within the military could lead to infighting that upends Putin’s attempt to create a new power base of loyal military veterans and leaves it vulnerable to future palace coups.

2. CHINA PITCHES STRONGER TIES WITH SOUTH ASIA IN DIPLOMATIC TOUR

This week China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducted a tour of several South Asian capitals, meeting with top leaders to promote closer ties with Beijing.

On August 19, Wang Yi visited New Delhi, India where he held talks on border demarcation issues with Indian Special Representative Ajit Doval. Afterwards Wang met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Key topics of conversation included stabilizing border issues, boosting bilateral ties, and participation in the BRICS+ and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

After concluding talks in India, Wang flew to Kabul, Afghanistan on August 20. On August 20, Wang met with Foreign Minister of the Taliban-led government in Kabul, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, as well as Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund. Unusually, Wang also met with Interior Minister of the Taliban-led government Sirajuddin Haqqani. The key topic of conversation was counter-terrorism.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) meets with a delegation of the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan led by Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani (right) Source: China MFA

On August 21, 2025 Wang flew to Islamabad, Pakistan to meet with top government officials. Wang conducted the Sixth Round of China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar. Following the Strategic Dialogue, Wang met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, and Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff Syed Asim Munir. Key topics of conversation included the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Gwadar Port, and security cooperation.

China's diplomatic tour of South Asia came amid the Trump Administration's pivot away from India toward Pakistan in regional relations. Wang’s audience with Narendra Modi followed President Trump’s announcement that the US would impose 50% tariffs on Indian exports for its support for Russia, participation in BRICS, and myriad other offenses. It also comes after a warming of relations between Pakistan and the US, which has been cultivated for months at the initiative of top Pakistani military officer, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. Munir nominated President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize after Trump’s involvement in de-escalating the May conflict between India and Pakistan. Trump has since explored boosting ties with Munir and Pakistan as his relationship with Prime Minister Modi has deteriorated. A repeated topic of meetings with Taliban officials was the crackdown on Uyghur separatism in Afghanistan. “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement is a terrorist organization designated by the United Nations Security Council. Wang Yi expressed the hope that Afghanistan will take China's concerns seriously and intensify its counter-terrorism efforts. Wang Yi expressed confidence that under the leadership of the Afghan government, Afghanistan will achieve greater development and deliver more benefits to its people.” —Read out of meeting between Chinese FM Wang Yi and Taliban PM Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement is a small Uyghur separatist organization with alleged links to Al Qaeda, and now the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). China claims the group has used remote regions of Afghanistan as a base to plan attacks and incite separatism in China. Beijing has sought to encourage the Taliban to crackdown on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) since it assumed power in 2021. While China has legitimate security interests in preventing terrorist activities within its borders, it has systematically exaggerated the threat posed by a small number of largely ineffective extremist elements within Uyghur nationalist movements. By lumping diverse groups under the single designation of the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement,” China has used this inflated threat to justify extensive domestic repression and increasingly global suppression of Uyghur Muslims as an entire population. NOTE: The US delisted the East Turkestan Islamic Movement from its register of global terrorist organizations in 2020 after observing no meaningful activity from the group in over a decade. Beijing’s repeated prompting of the Taliban to engage in counter-terrorism against ETIM, appears to be a dog whistle to encourage the group to imprison or destroy Uyghur populations, or extradite them back to China. China has successfully pursued this approach with other Muslim nations in Central Asia and the Middle East. The most remarkable event of all of Wang Yi’s diplomatic exchanges was his meeting with Sirajuddin Haqqani. Sirajuddin Haqqani, neither Foreign Minister nor national leader, is not a logical meeting for Wang. Haqqani is instead leader of the Taliban’s secret police and is one of the most globally recognized and sanctioned terrorist leaders, including by the UN Security Council. Haqqani is a major power broker in not only the Taliban-led government in Kabul, but in the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda. Haqqani’s broader sphere of influence may have been the reason for the meeting with Wang. Wang Yi raised the issue of resuming joint Chinese and Afghan patrols near the Wakhan corridor (where the Afghan and Pakistani borders merge along that of the Chinese province of Xinjiang) with Haqqani. It is not clear though what power Haqqani wields in that region as a power broker as the Wakhan corridor falls well outside the traditional boundaries of the Haqqani network. Whatever the reason, Beijing’s decision to publicize the talks, just over four years after the August 2021 fall of Kabul to the Taliban, is highly provocative.

3. CHINA CONDUCTS SHOW OF FORCE NEAR SECOND THOMAS SHOAL

This week Beijing deployed significant Coast Guard and maritime militia forces near Second Thomas Shoal in the West Philippine Sea. These forces included speedboats armed with crew-served weapons and at least one helicopter.

Chinese vessels anchored near Second Thomas Shoal on August 20, 2025. Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines on X.

This is one of the largest shows of force China has made near Second Thomas Shoal in months. The Armed Forces of the Philippines acknowledged the patrols were “unusual” in their open displays of heavy weapons. China’s aggressive behavior near Scarborough Shoal has attracted more attention in recent weeks, but its activity near Second Thomas Shoal is arguably more dangerous and destabilizing for regional security. China has an even weaker claim to Second Thomas Shoal than the illegal claim it has made to Scarborough Shoal. Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef that is much further away from China’s borders and is far closer to the Philippines. Second Thomas Shoal is a potential flashpoint for a major military confrontation with the Philippines due to the country’s “Sierra Madre” outpost on the reef. The Sierra Madre is a partially sunken landing ship of the Philippines Navy which was deliberately scuttled on the reef and turned into a strongpoint to formalize the country’s claim to the waters. China regularly tries to prevent the Philippines from resupplying or rotating troops at the Sierra Madre.

4. NORTH KOREA HONORS NEW WAR VETERANS AND WAR DEAD

Kim Jong-un met with and bestowed state honors upon military commanders returning from North Korea’s combat mission to Russia on August 21. On August 22, leading North Korean government officials held a ceremonial dinner at the Mokran House (a banquet hall for the North Korean Central Committee in Pyongyang), honoring the commanders of units of the Korean People’s Army which had recently redeployed from Russia. Families of fallen North Korean soldiers were also honored. On August 22, North Korean state broadcaster Korean Central Television (KCTV) aired a documentary on North Korean troops engaging in combat against Ukrainian forces in Kursk. This is the first time North Korean media has published such a comprehensive look into North Korean operations.

Rebroadcast of KCTV documentary. Source: Kanal13 on YouTube

The numerous public honors awarded to units of the Korean People’s Army deployed to Russia, indicate the Kim regime is becoming much more comfortable airing its involvement in the war. This openness is evidenced in the release of the documentary on North Korean combat operations, the first time North Korean media has published such a comprehensive look at Pyongyang’s involvement in the war. Some analysts have suggested the sudden summoning of North Korean commanders back to Pyongyang could indicate that the Kim regime is considering winding down operations in the war. It is a plausible explanation as North Korean troops are believed to have sustained significant casualties (amounting to a third or more of the 15,000 troops initially deployed). Further deployments of North Korean troops, which South Korean intelligence assessed could arrive in August, would have to fight in Ukraine due to the wrap up of fighting near Kursk. Such a deployment would represent a significant escalation in the North Korean war effort that the Kim regime may not be prepared for. Having come this far, and tying its regime security with that of the Putin Kremlin, it is still likely that North Korea will remain involved in supporting the Russian war effort. Pyongyang may simply be resetting operations, and/or holding out for greater incentives before committing more troops.

Due_Search_8040 on August 24th, 2025 at 05:45 UTC »

SS: This post analyzes some significant geopolitical developments from August 16-23 involving Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Key events covered include the Kremlin rebuffs US efforts to arrange direct negotiations between Zelensky and Putin and provide Ukraine with substantive security guarantees; China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducts a whirlwind diplomatic tour of South Asia amid a shift in US relations from India to Pakistan; China puts on a major show of force in disputed waters in the West Philippine Sea; North Korea publicly celebrates with contributions to Russia’s war effort in Kursk.

Things to keep a close eye on:

South Korea previously reported that North Korea was planning a new deployment of combat troops to Russia. Does this week's celebrations for the Korean People's Army preface such a deployment or indicate a change of plans.

India has resumed purchasing oil from Russia (arguably an action within its national interest) but is it really prepared to cozy up to Beijing out of spite for the US (arguably not in its long-term national interest)?

What will Russia's counter proposal's to direct negotiations with Zelensky be? Merely a regurgitation of the same stalling tactics or new means of assuring the Trump Administration that progress is being made?