Putin could plunge UK into total blackout unless undersea cables are protected

Britain's network of 45 undersea cables provide essential power and communication services but are vulnerable to sabotage from a hostile state and would take months to repair

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Britain risks being plunged into darkness with its communication networks and power supplies crippled unless ministers act to protect the UK’s undersea cable infrastructure from a Russian attack, marine industry experts have warned.

The UK has some 45 cables connecting Britain to other countries that carry essential power supplies and vast quantities of data including financial information.

The Ministry of Defence says the growing use of the seabed has “increased opportunities for adversaries to threaten Western subsea critical national infrastructure”.

Cable sabotage would cost millions to fix

Iain Grainger, the head of an industry body representing specialists in building and repairing marine infrastructure such as cables and wind turbines, fears the country is not prepared for a co-ordinated attack on undersea infrastructure.

He says an act of sabotage that cut a major undersea cable could cost tens of millions of pounds to fix, and would take up to nine months to repair with everything from international bank transfers to medical procedures put at risk.

Subsea cables in UK and surrounding waters (Phtoo: KIS-ORCA)

Grainger has called on ministers to invest in a dedicated “strategic fleet” of ships and experts who can be placed on call to repair cables very quickly, minimising disruption.

He said: “It’s not uncommon for a repair and a power cable to take six or nine months because the procedures, the people, the spare parts and the vessels were not sitting on standby.”

Grainger added. “One of the bottlenecks of carrying out the repairs, depending on where it is, is some of the permits, licences and visas required to even be able to go and do the work. It can take you months to get a visa for one of those people to work in on a ship in UK waters…That doesn’t make any sense.”

Iain Grainger, CEO of the International Maritime Contractors Association, has urged the Government to invest in a ‘strategic fleet’ to protect UK undersea cables (Photo: IMCA)

Undersea cables across Europe have been monitored, tampered with and cut in the past few years. While over 50 Russian vessels have been observed around areas of high cable density in the Baltic Sea in recent years.

An undersea power cable linking Finland and Estonia that was cut on Christmas Day last year is only just now being fixed seven months later, highlighting Europe’s current slow response to the growing threat.

It comes as the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) warned that critical national infrastructure operators “do not have the ability to protect the infrastructure they own in the face of complex and evolving threats”.

It recommended a “new deal” rooted in partnerships between defence, private industry and allied operators, with models from Nordic and the Baltic states held up as examples.

Emma Salisbury, an associate fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre and contributing author to the SDR, said any effort to secure and repair undersea cabling will need to “work closely” with government and the Royal Navy.

She said: “The cables and pipelines that run through British waters are extensive and the sheer geographical challenge of monitoring and protecting them requires a huge number of eyes on ships.

“The infrastructure itself is owned by private companies, so they will absolutely need to do their part, but the government should be providing support and linking private efforts with those of the Royal Navy and other state entities, as well as co-ordinating with neighbouring allied nations.”

National life depends on secure undersea cables

Labour chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, Matt Western, told The i Paper: “Resilience is about being able to bounce back, and the availability of repair vessels is a key issue.

“We are examining this closely as part of our inquiry into the security of undersea telecommunications infrastructure”.

The SDR called for the Royal Navy to take a new “leading and co-ordinating role in securing undersea pipelines, cables, and maritime traffic carrying the information, energy and goods upon which national life depends”.

Grainger welcomed the response but said a good starting point would be to create an inventory of the UK’s cables to understand how each one is made, to repair them quicker.

He said: “There’s got to be an inventory of every cable done to know which cable was supplied by which manufacturer and which spare parts and matched to technicians,

“We’re not talking about millions to go and build a ship or to make a long-term commitment, but they at least the effort to map the cables, know where they are, know what they’re made of, know how to repair them. All of that work could get started.”

A Government spokesperson said: “We work closely across government and with industry to ensure we have the resilient infrastructure we need, now and in the future, including protecting against a range of threats.

“On the rare occasions when breaks happen, there is normally no noticeable disruption, as extra capacity is built into the system.”