Game Plan: After Ukraine

Ukraine is not yet defeated. But Russia has already won the battle that matters most: with the West. Decision-makers in Washington DC, London, Berlin, and Brussels (to name just a few capitals) had the chance to counter Russian imperialism alongside a big, strong, determined country. They decided instead to drip-feed aid and soft-pedal sanctions, for fear of the risks of Russian defeat. Ukraine’s thousand days of sacrifice bought Europe time to rebuild its defenses. It wasted that too.

The price of that is now huge. The Kremlin’s war machine will not stop in Ukraine. The next target is NATO, probably in the Baltic states. Thanks to some fine investigative work by Polish, Lithuanian, and Estonian journalists, we now have a better idea of what is underway. They have used open-source satellite imagery to build a picture of Russia’s military bases in the region and quizzed current and former military leaders to interpret the results.

Nothing will happen immediately. Russia’s presence is heavily depleted. The Baltic Fleet’s landing capability has gone. Barracks, training grounds, and car parks are empty. Huge amounts of equipment and spare parts went to Ukraine. We still have time. But not much.

Russia is now capable of reconstituting its forces quickly. And the most dangerous attacks are likely to be different from the “meat grinder” tactics used in Ukraine. The aim will be not to conquer swathes of territory but to destroy NATO’s credibility.

Kaliningrad plays a big role here. In the event of a conflict, military logic dictates an immediate NATO onslaught on the Russian exclave, neutralizing its air defenses, missile-launching sites, nuclear facilities, submarine harbors, and other capabilities before they can be used to block reinforcements, isolate the Baltic states, or intimidate other countries.

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But Western decision-makers may flinch at that or at deep strikes into other Russian territory. Their fears of escalation have crippled Ukraine. Applied to the Baltic region, the same thinking would dictate that a limited attack should merit only a limited response. Another worry is that the US might be distracted by a conflict with China, meaning that its scarce air defense and precision-strike assets were needed elsewhere.

Either way, a limited response would be the end of NATO. One casualty would be unity. Would commanders in the frontline states obey an American order telling them not to defend their country with every weapon they have? Probably not. Indeed, several countries are busily acquiring long-range strikes in order to deal just such devasting, immediate blows to the attacker. An even bigger casualty would be the alliance’s credibility. Even a small, symbolic Russian raid on NATO territory that goes unpunished marks the end of the collective security guarantee. That will be the ultimate triumph for Putin.

Key to Russia’s victory are successful sub-threshold attacks. Already these happen on a near daily basis in NATO countries, including arson, air-space intrusions, and electronic warfare. In the Baltic sea region, the investigation reveals alarming news, in particular several locations in Kaliningrad where Russia has been developing “intelligence, sabotage and attack infrastructure”. It highlights the 561st Special Purpose Naval Intelligence Point based in Parusnoye, where Russian special forces are trained for operations on the Baltic Sea coast. An alarming, well-sourced section of the Lithuanian journalists’ report suggests that this unit may already have carried out a mission, undetected at the time, on Lithuanian soil in 2015.

Russia’s aim is clear: to use such stunts to pose a sharp strategic dilemma to NATO decision-makers. Whether the frontline states can develop the defence and deterrence that they need to stop this will determine the safety and freedom of all Europe.

Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.