Russia’s ‘Global Majority’? Struggling to Find the Numbers

The Kremlin’s rallying cry to the world’s downtrodden has only been heard by the planet’s most odious regimes.

The Kremlin likes to describe itself as the epicenter of a world movement, a beacon for a “non-Western world” oppressed by Americans and assorted lackeys denying the rights of the global majority.

You might imagine this propaganda theme would resonate with the world’s poor and downtrodden. So far, however, there’s little sign it’s attracted anyone except the usual suspects in Tehran, Pyongyang, and a handful of other countries with atrocious human rights records. A gathering of the oppressors rather than the oppressed, critics might say.

In the oft-repeated Russian telling, the country underlined its revered status by attacking its neighbor Ukraine in the “special military operation” of February 2022. This blow for the oppressed, launched by a country of 142 million against a nation with less than one-third of its population, was sufficiently inspirational to cement its place as a leader of the non-Western world. This status is confirmed by the Russian leader Vladimir Putin himself, who often states that “Russia is one of the leaders of the global majority and the objective process of building a more just multi-polar world.”

In July, the United Nations General Assembly, the world’s primary political forum, voted by 99-9 to demand that Russia halt its aggression against Ukraine and withdraw its forces. The Kremlin might draw some comfort from the growing number of countries now abstaining on such votes (60 this time) but it’s hardly a ringing endorsement.

Nonetheless, pro-Kremlin analysts, Sergey Karagaov, Dmitriy Trenin, and others released a report last year entitled The Policy of Russia in Relation to the World Majority, in which they mapped out this leadership role.

In their opinion, this World Majority is “a civilizational and cultural community that objectively opposes the universalist, globalist West, which seeks by all means to prolong its hegemony.” Russia, according to the Kremlin experts, participates with others in this community in “the construction of a new infrastructure of the world order, control of which will be shared among states and their organizations.” This will not happen by magic, however, meaning that the Putin regime must provide its leadership in institutions created by the countries of the World Majority.

This is an illusion, not least because the Kremlin has become ever more dependent on its partners, revealing itself not as the leader, but rather as an asset used by other states. At the end of 2022, the Berlin Carnegie Center wrote that at the beginning of the year (before the all-out invasion of Ukraine), Turkey was more in need of a partnership with Russia than the other way around, after several months Istanbul became a key economic partner of Russia.

Everything from import substitution schemes to technological imports from Europe, as well as continuing — albeit much lower —Russian gas exports, began to depend on Turkey.

As a result, as noted by the Carnegie Center analysts, the Kremlin was forced to take into account the ambitions and interests of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. That meant acknowledging Turkish foreign policy requirements, as well as Russian companies providing significant discounts to Turkish partners to keep open their window to the European market.

Besides increased dependence on India, China, and Turkey, Russia is also increasingly moving toward dependency in its relations with Iran. Analysts note that trade between the two countries, which increased after the start of the war, fell by almost 20% by the end of 2023, as Iran reduced purchases of Russian wheat. Gazprom’s multibillion-dollar investments in Iran have yet to generate a return, while the much-heralded Rasht-Astara rail link has not yet started.

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The exception is the military sphere in which Iran provides Russia with drones and other supplies: shells, bullets, bullet-proof vests, and anti-tank missiles. However, as analysts point out, while in this area Iran serves as a symbol of the fact that “Russia cannot be isolated” it provides little economic assistance. One of the main problems that prevents Russian businesses from building relationships even with “ideologically close” partners remains the absence of effective mechanisms for accounting and logistics.

The absence of a system of accounting, which might compete with the Western model is recognized as a problem by the pro-Kremlin experts themselves. Valdai Club analysts with amazing regularity write that such a system could be created by the new BRICS development bank. At the beginning of this month, they returned to this theme again calling upon BRICS to participate “in the ongoing process of de-dollarization of the global financial system” while complaining that no real progress has been made.

The article’s author, Valdai Club Program Director Oleg Barabanov, concludes that “not a single BRICS country is prepared to refrain from full sovereign control of its own currency” and this will not soon change. He therefore suggested “using the digital yuan for payments within the framework of the Belt and Road program,” stating that “since all projects of this program are Sino-centric in the good sense of the word” and China already retains control over investments within this, the risks of turning the yuan into a new reserve currency would be low. Thus, Valdai Club experts called on Russia to switch to payments to the Chinese currency and increasingly integrate into “China-centric” programs.

Writers at the pro-Kremlin international journal, Russia in Global Affairs, accept that Russia does not have much leverage even over North Korea, which one observer recently termed Moscow’s “nuclear offshore.”

Russian analysts say the country is now free to work with North Korea since it no longer attempts to achieve harmonious relations with the West. While Anastasia Barannikova acknowledges that “China is and in the foreseeable future will remain the main trading partner of the DPRK,” this means Russia assumes the role of the rogue regime’s “main military ally.”

“The DPRK does not view Russia as a threat, not least due to Moscow’s lack of a dominant position in the region and leverage over Pyongyang. Russia refrains from attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the DPRK and does not question the country’s right to defense and protection of sovereignty,” she says.

Yet another force with which the Kremlin must increasingly reckon is the Taliban. Recently, even official Russian media enumerated the conditions for removing this organization from the terrorist list, in particular, respect for the rights of girls and women, and the creation of an inclusive government that would include representatives not only of the Pashtuns but also other groups. But Putin has now called the Taliban “Russia’s ally in the fight against terrorism,” with no mention of the fact that the movement is officially banned in his country.

For now, at least, the Kremlin is increasingly dependent on the most odious regimes on the planet. Hemmed in by its decision to pursue its aggression against Ukraine, it remains an outsider. Whatever propaganda it pumps out, the global majority remains alienated or largely indifferent to its fate.

Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy. The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.