Japan’s Long-Awaited Return to Geopolitics

At the close of 2022, the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida released three new strategic documents: a new National Security Strategy , National Defense Strategy , and Defense Buildup Plan . Then, in January, he and his foreign and defense ministers traveled to Washington to meet their U.S. counterparts. There, Japan’s new strategic thinking was on full display in joint statements with U.S. President Joe Biden as well as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Among other changes, Tokyo has announced the intention to increase defense spending by nearly 60 percent over five years, abandoning an informal budget cap of 1 percent of GDP that was put in place for political purposes back in the 1970s. This alone represents an almost revolutionary departure from long-standing defense practices.

Russia’s war in Ukraine, which marks the return of naked, World War II-style aggression to Europe, is surely another such inflection point. But there is a second, less-noticed shift taking place right now that has at least as much power to alter history: the return of Japan as a major geopolitical actor. In the span of only one month from mid-December 2022 to mid-January of this year, Japan revised large parts of its post-1945 security posture and replaced it with a new strategy that—if implemented—would create a more robust and forward-leaning Japan. Tokyo’s policy shifts may signal a Japan that is not only more willing and capable of involving itself in geopolitical issues beyond its own narrow, defensive interests but also more likely to act in ways commensurate with its strategic position, regional interests, and economic might.

In geopolitics, rarely do we realize that a tectonic shift is taking place the moment it is happening. There are a few exceptions: the Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s first space satellite, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the 9/11 attacks. These moments were historical inflection points that were plain for all to see.

At the close of 2022, the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida released three new strategic documents: a new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Plan. Then, in January, he and his foreign and defense ministers traveled to Washington to meet their U.S. counterparts. There, Japan’s new strategic thinking was on full display in joint statements with U.S. President Joe Biden as well as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Among other changes, Tokyo has announced the intention to increase defense spending by nearly 60 percent over five years, abandoning an informal budget cap of 1 percent of GDP that was put in place for political purposes back in the 1970s. This alone represents an almost revolutionary departure from long-standing defense practices.

In addition to an array of sophisticated military equipment, Japan also seeks to acquire counterstrike missiles: long-range precision-guided munitions designed to deter an adversary’s attack, something Tokyo has historically eschewed. Other key changes include the creation of a permanent joint operational headquarters, the transfer of authority over the Japan Coast Guard to the Ministry of Defense during any conflict, the establishment of a robust cyberdefense, and a new commitment to intelligence capabilities.

The motivation for Japan’s historic shift is twofold: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s bullying approach to regional relations.

Even more significant than specific capabilities, however, is Japan’s comprehensive expansion of its security interests beyond the defense of its own islands. With its lodestar of a free and open Indo-Pacific—on which Japan, as an island nation, crucially depends—Japan now freely talks about its interests in the South and East China Seas, the Pacific Islands, the Taiwan Strait, and as far away as Europe, with growing strategic partnerships with countries that see their interests tied to the same free and open seas. Whereas Japan once focused only on immediate self-defense, it is now taking a broader, more global view of its security across multiple regions. The result will be a Japan more deeply enmeshed in global security affairs, becoming less a beneficiary of security provided by others—chiefly the United States—and potentially more a security provider itself.

Even more remarkable is the fact that these changes have elicited such little opposition, either in Japan or in the region. When the United States and Japan were revising their security treaty in 1959 and 1960, there were hundreds of thousands of protesters in Japan’s streets. Even when the Shinzo Abe administration passed a package of security laws in 2015 that expanded the range of situations in which Tokyo can authorize the use of force and reinterpreted Japan’s right to engage in collective self-defense, there were considerable protests throughout Tokyo’s political district. This time? Not only are there no large-scale protests, but the debate has shifted from whether Japan should take these actions to how the country will pay for them. The Kishida administration is gifted with an issue on which it has so much support that it is pushing on an open door.

In the region, Japan’s new strategic posture has provoked little anxiety and few words of condemnation. Even in South Korea, which has been critical of Japanese defense efforts in the past, President Yoon Suk-yeol acknowledged that Japan’s moves—including acquiring counterstrike missiles—are understandable given North Korean threats. Beijing, unsurprisingly, said it was “firmly opposed” to and “strongly dissatisfied” with Japan’s new documents, accusing Tokyo of “[provoking] regional tension and confrontation.”

The motivation for Japan’s historic shift is twofold. The first is that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests not only naked aggression is still possible in today’s globalized and integrated world but also that survival against a much larger neighbor depends on being well defended. The second, of course, is China’s approach to regional relations, which relies on bullying, provocation, coercion, and disrespect for international law, such as in the South and East China Seas. Japan has endured this behavior for years and finally appears to be fed up. When actions by Russia and China are viewed together, Japanese leaders and the country’s public are increasingly seeing conflict as an ever-present risk. As Kishida has said, “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Japan might not be thinking that way if it were not for continuous provocations by China (and North Korea).

As promising as Japan’s actions appear, there are questions about actual implementation. Some steps are easier to predict than others: It is widely expected, for example, that Japan will continue to strengthen its quasi-alliance with Australia, likely through defense exercises, closer coordination of development assistance to Pacific Island nations, and strategic coordination in conjunction with the United States. But what about other partners in the region and beyond? Japan’s ties with South Korea appear, finally, to be improving. As long as the two countries keep World War II history from dominating their agenda, their common security concerns may allow Tokyo to work closer with Seoul on defense. Elsewhere, Japan’s first major defense export went to the Philippines, with which Japan also recently conducted its first-ever joint exercise. Given common security concerns over China, even closer security ties are likely in the years ahead. And given Japan’s view that European and Indo-Pacific security are linked, it is likely that Japan will continue to pursue closer ties with key European allies. Already, there is important movement, including an agreement that Japan will participate in NATO meetings on a regular basis as well as Japanese-British agreements on reciprocal access and the joint development of an advanced fighter jet.

Critical questions, however, remain. Japan pledges it will carry out “vigorous diplomacy” to foster a desirable security environment, but what will this look like? Will Japan push for greater leadership positions in international bodies? Will it get more involved in the global south? It is understandable that Japan is supporting Ukraine to push back against Russian aggression, but how far will Japanese support to Europe go? In Southeast Asia, where Japan historically has provided development assistance and security cooperation, Japan’s new strategy suggests it could take on more of a leadership position to help these smaller states push back against China. But how will this be implemented in practice? Similarly, how do Japan’s explicitly stated interests in the Taiwan Strait translate into what Japan is actually willing to do? If it comes to a Chinese attack, will Japan defend Taiwan? And finally, while plans to bolster the Japanese armed forces suggest a potentially more capable military, will challenges in resourcing and weapons development result in a less robust defense buildup?

None of this is meant to minimize the seriousness of Tokyo’s new policies or the historic change the world is witnessing. In very short order, Japan moved to change decades of strategic thinking and embark on a new approach to security. No one forced Japan to change: Washington did not coerce Tokyo into such a dramatic increase of its defense spending. The stark reality of geopolitics and the realization that what was once hypothetical is now possible were likely enough to convince Japan that the time for a new approach to its security is now.