In this episode of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project Podcast, John Spencer is joined by Michael Kofman, research program director in the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He researches Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in Russian armed forces, military thought, capabilities, and strategy.
In the conversation, Kofman first explains the general composition and force design of the Russian military. He also analyzes Russia’s military performance in Ukraine, beginning with the initial phase of the invasion. The discussion then explores some of the major urban battles that have taken place during the war, particularly in Kyiv and Mariupol. The conversation wraps up with Kofman identifying some of the conclusions that he believes researchers and observers should—and in some cases, should not—be drawing from the war.
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captchalove on August 20th, 2022 at 04:37 UTC »
One of the most interesting parts of the podcast was Kofman's idea of what Russia was attempting with the original invasion back in February.
His explanation is that the plan was in the mould of Operation Danube in 1968 or Storm-333 in 1979 - send in the airborne units to take the airport (Prague Intl/Bagram air base), set up an airbridge to reinforce troops, link up with ground forces and capture (1968) or kill (1979) the sitting president. Basically a regime change operation.
The playbook didn't work in Ukraine because the air defenses there were stronger than the Russians anticipated, and the ground forces didn't have enough forewarning to position so that they could actually reach the airport in time to relieve the airborne units.
"What do you call an airborne unit that hasn't been reinforced in 3 days? POWs."
Then he briefly mentions an intel-based component to the invasion - arranged by the FSB - that failed to materialize at all, and how some of the invading troops in the first few days had Ukrainian uniforms and Ukrainian kit. But the details about this side are still sketchy.
Conclusion: don't assume this happened to the Russians because their army is terrible and that it could never happen to us (Americans). You can't assume that you'll always have air superiority from day 1, and that you can set aside weeks for the air force to flatten enemy air defenses. You might have to face enemies with MANPADs and modern artillery in an urban setting, so it's a good idea to plan accordingly.
jason_moremoa on August 19th, 2022 at 14:57 UTC »
Kofman is the most straightforward, no bs commentator I know on this war, always enjoy his stuff.
jspencer508 on August 19th, 2022 at 14:13 UTC »
In this episode of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project Podcast, John Spencer is joined by Michael Kofman, research program director in the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He researches Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in Russian armed forces, military thought, capabilities, and strategy. In the conversation, Kofman first explains the general composition and force design of the Russian military. He also analyzes Russia’s military performance in Ukraine, beginning with the initial phase of the invasion. The discussion then explores some of the major urban battles that have taken place during the war, particularly in Kyiv and Mariupol. The conversation wraps up with Kofman identifying some of the conclusions that he believes researchers and observers should—and in some cases, should not—be drawing from the war.