This historical evidence also shows that dinner involves a “profound moral question,” as Alito said of abortion in Dobbs.
That sets it apart from other constitutional rights that don’t raise moral questions, like what counts as cruel and unusual punishment or what counts as religious freedom.
The nature of dinner—when it can be eaten, what can be served, and who may take part in it—is also a matter of sharp and persistent division among the American people themselves.
That distinguishes it from other constitutional rights like freedom of speech and the right to bear arms, where Americans rarely disagree.
Now that I have laid out such a clear and convincing argument, I want to take a moment to address some potential criticism of it.
A professional background in history is also not necessary to unearth the original public meaning of the Constitution.
Another possible critique is that I am misreading Anglo-American legal history to arrive at a predetermined conclusion by leaving out crucial context. »