Disinformation and the Donbas: The End Point of Maskirovka?

Disinformation (dezinformatsiya) and deception (maskirovka) have been key strategic tenants of Russian statecraft and foreign policy since before the Second World War. They encapsulate traditional battlefield deception (everything from camouflage to manufactured signals intelligence), intelligence tradecraft, large scale PSYOPs and political manipulation; both domestic and international. In recent periods this has involved an increasing utilisation of cyber disinformation campaigns aimed at pushing Kremlin interests both globally and domestically, creating an environment of confusion and distrust that stretches far beyond Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence.

In spring 2021, Reports of a Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders surfaced. Videos documenting the movement of Russian troops and military equipment began surfacing on social media as early as March and were soon backed by statements from Washington. According to Department of Defence Spokesman John Kirby, these escalations far exceeded those which occurred during the height of the conflict during 2014. The Pentagon did not release any concrete figures to back this claim, however it was clearly not perceived as conjecture by Kyiv who in early April reacted to the situation by publishing an updated map of structures within the city which could be used as shelter by residents in the eventuality of a ‘man-made or military emergency’. Beyond increasing diplomatic tensions between Moscow and the West, this period also saw a drastic intensification of fighting within the Donbas region, with increased casualties of both Ukrainian military personnel, DPR separatists and civilians.

The build-up of military forces on Ukraine’s border and Russia’s increasingly aggressive posturing towards Ukraine was supported by a disinformation campaign conducted by pro-Kremlin media outlets which target the country. Some of these campaigns include stories that are as incendiary as they are repetitive; notably, in a story debunked by independent Russian fact-checkers, pro-Kremlin media claimed that a Ukrainian drone was responsible for the death of a small boy in Donbas, a story that resembled an earlier case of disinformation pushed by pro-Kremlin sources during the annexation of Crimea in which Ukrainian nationalists crucified a small boy in the city of Slovyansk. Such misinformation campaigns are targeted at the Russian populace as a means of gaining consent for the Kremlin’s military strategy in the region via the demonization of Ukrainians.

On April 23 Russian news agency TASS published a statement from Russia’s Defence Ministry which declared that the troops were being redeployed from the border back to their permanent bases. They declined to give a detailed reasoning on the purposes of the movements, only stating that the forces involved had been engaged in a ‘sudden military inspection’ adding that ‘the goals of the inspection were achieved in full’

The purpose of the build-up was left ambiguous. However its effects were palpable in both Kyiv and Washington. Kyiv remained steadfast in their ambition to join NATO, with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy pushing for a ‘membership action plan’, something which is viewed by the Kremlin as a direct existential threat, running counter to its pursuit of strategic depth. Meanwhile, Washington announced a fresh round of sanctions alongside the expulsion of ten Russian diplomats. Actions which directly challenge Russian interests and signal an entrenchment of previously established positions on the conflict.

A key aspect of this build up and apparent withdrawal was that the latter remained incomplete; whilst the bulk of the Russian forces mobilised were moved back their permanent stations away from the border, military hardware was left behind, including a significant arsenal at Russia’s Pogonovo base, located 250 Kilometres from Ukrainian controlled territory in Luhansk.

What occurred in April foreshadows the current, more troubling military build-up on Ukraine’s borders; a obscurantist military deployment, in which attempts at the concealment of troop and resource movements are made, a ramped up disinformation campaign and an increasingly hostile rhetoric from the Kremlin which signals an attempt to challenge NATO at a time when the treaty’s commitment to supporting Ukraine is questionable. However in this instance there are a few compelling differences to the earlier deployment which signal that the current situation is more precarious.

In the recent build-up greater effort has been made to conceal the movement of troops towards the Ukrainian border. During the previous spring build-up, Moscow seemed to intend that the movement of military equipment / troops were more visible to observers; excusing them by linking their movements to military exercises. In contrast, the current situation has received little commentary from Moscow aside from its usual broader rhetoric towards Ukraine and NATO, and no announcements of training exercises in the region have been made.

The content and placement of the current build-up have also become cause for alarm among analysts. Amongst the elements mobilised by the Kremlin are the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA), a division headquartered in Novosibirsk in Siberia and previously based in Russia’s Central Military District. The 41st CAA was involved in the spring build-up, being deployed to Pogonovo, however in October it had again moved to Yelnia in the Smolensk region bordering Belarus. This compounds the pressure already placed on Ukraine by the conflict in the East and the troops stationed along that flank, as it gives Moscow the potential to order an attack from the North aimed at isolating Kyiv from reinforcements and establishing positions on the west bank of the Dnieper. The movements of the 41st CAA also appear to be fairly kinetic; with frequent movements around the camp suggesting training exercises, some of which potentially taking place in Belarus itself.

Crimea has also seen an increase in the deployment of troops and military assets, including armoured divisions, tank battalions and air defence weaponry. This provides Russia with an increased capacity to attack southern Ukraine; including the potential for an amphibious assault on Odessa which could be bolstered by Russian forces stationed in the break-away Moldavian Republic of Transnistria.

What remains is the Eastern Front bordering the Donbas, the area currently experiencing active conflict between the Ukrainian forces and the Separatists operating from Donetsk and Luhansk. Here the already porous border with Russia has seen an extensive build-up of military capacities at both Russia’s Pogonovo and Postoyalye Dvory bases. The latter is less than 300km North of Ukraine’s second largest city Kharkiv. These build-ups are in addition to the Russian forces already active covertly inside Ukraine’s borders alongside the separatist forces they support in the Donbas. Build-ups in this region have been accompanied by an intensification of hostilities inside the Donbas, with 101 ceasefire violations recorded by OSCE monitors on the 17th December alone.

Equally as concerning as movements on the ground is the geopolitical context in which they take place. The escalations come at a time when US foreign policy is applying greater focus to the Pacific region to counter the influence of an emergent China and appears to have little interest for intervention after its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Further to this, other key NATO members, including Britain, France and Germany, are reluctant to militarily intervene, and despite the proximity of the Baltic NATO members, the fact that further Russian incursions into Ukraine would not constitute an article 5 scenario makes a NATO intervention unlikely, a fact that has arguably emboldened Moscow who may be seeking to consolidate strategic gains made in the region over the eight year conflict.

It remains to be seen if the actions taken by Russia constitute an intention to directly cross the border and seize more land in Ukraine either in its entirety, an action which seems unlikely given the potential difficulties posed by resistance from a battle hardened Ukrainian military and a fiercely resolute population, or in part via an annexation of the Separatist held territories in the Donbas and the creation of a corridor stretching from Luhansk to Crimea. The latter, which is arguably the most likely, could take place in a manner akin to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, with Separatist forces doing the bulk of the fighting and Russian forces supporting covertly. This strategy could prove to be more attractive to Moscow as it involves less investment of Russian military personnel. However this strategy would likely only be actionable in the regions currently occupied by the Separatists and not in a heavily defended city such as Mariupal which would require a more overt Russian engagement.

Another explanation of the recent escalation is that the Kremlin is using the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine as a proxy to challenge NATO and force concessions from the Treaty; another example of maskirovka at play, with troop movements, rhetoric and leaked intelligence all manufactured to create the appearance of a threat that is never intended to be fulfilled. This theory is arguably supported by the Kremlin issuing a statement of demands to NATO which precludes the organisations expansion into Ukraine and Georgia, alongside limiting its activities in the Baltic States. These demands, although strategically logical from the perspective of Russia which feels encircled by NATO, are radical and are likely to be met negatively by the organisation. One of the Kremlin’s demands includes having a veto on new memberships to the treaty; something NATO has repeatedly stated it considers unacceptable.

Russia will no doubt be aware of this. The question remains then if the Kremlin are issuing a set of demands that it knows will not be met in order to bring NATO to the bargaining table in the hopes of securing more reasonable concessions upon further negotiations, or if this is another layer of maskirova aimed at masking their intentions to conduct an overt military offensive in Ukraine whilst representing themselves as the aggrieved party in the eyes of their own populace.

Here is where the danger lies, tensions are undoubtedly high in the region, and Vladimir Putin and the Russian state cannot be seen to walk away empty handed from negotiations with an organisation it has vilified and painted as an aggressor through its various disinformation channels and state controlled media. Neither can it be seen to abandon the Russian speaking populace in East Ukraine, who it has depicted as marginalised victims of what it describes as a fascistic Ukrainian government.

The outcome of the recent escalation is therefore far from certain, and the motives of the Russian state are clouded in an intricate web of disinformation that may have gained a dangerous and unpredictable momentum of its own. It remains to be seen if the actions of the Russian military reflect a genuine intention to cross the borders of Ukraine and provoke a catastrophic conflict or if they are brinkmanship aimed at securing concessions from NATO. It is also worth questioning if Moscow can pull back the momentum of its own disinformation campaigns and an extensive military build-up. What lies at the end point of maskirovka is unclear, perhaps not only for observers but also for the Kremlin itself.